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IN MEMORIAL 
 
On February 28, 
2004, 53-year-old 
RCMP Corporal Jim 
Galloway was shot 
after gunfire erupted 
at the scene of a 
standoff at a home in 
Spruce Grove, Alberta. Officers were originally 
called to investigate a report of a bullet hole in a 
vehicle. A resident told investigating officers 
that there was an agitated man in a nearby 
residence and he was armed. The RCMP 
emergency response team was called in to seal 
off the area.  
 
The suspect attempted to leave the area in a 
vehicle. Gunfire erupted and Corporal Galloway 
and the suspect both sustained severe injuries. 
They were taken to hospital by ambulance where 
Corporal Galloway and the suspect were 
pronounced dead.  
 
Corporal Galloway joined the RCMP in 1969 and 
its police dog section in 1975. Among his many 
personal initiatives to aid the search and rescue 
(SAR) community was his work in helping Alberta 
search dog teams form a province-wide 
association, called the RCMP Civilian Search and 
Rescue Service Dog Association, and teaching 
and implementing standards for SAR dog teams.   
 
In 2002, Corporal Galloway received a 
Certificate of Achievement 
in Halifax at SARSCENE, 
the annual search and 
rescue workshop sponsored 
by the National Search and 
Rescue Secretariat. 
 
 
Corporal Galloway had 35 years of service with 
the RCMP and is survived by his wife and family.  
 
This information provided by the Officer Down 
Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada  
 
 ‘ACTIVE’ POLICE 
SUPERVISION MOST 
INFLUENTIAL 
 
If police supervisors 
want to have the most 
influence on their 
subordinates, they 
should consider 
leading by example and 
working alongside them. In a recent U.S. 
Department of Justice publication (June 2003) 
by Dr. Robin Shepard Engel entitled How Police 
Supervisory Styles Influence Patrol Officer 
Behavior, the author examined how much 
influence four supervisory styles—traditional, 
innovative, supportive, and active—had on 
subordinate performance. “The most important 
finding was that style or quality of field 
supervision can significantly influence patrol 
officer behaviour, quite apart from quantity of 
supervision,” said the report.  
 
The traditional supervisor expects aggressive 
enforcement, rather than community oriented 
activities, and is more likely to take over 
encounters with citizens or instruct officers how 
to handle situations. They are “highly task 
oriented and expect subordinates to produce 
measurable outcomes—particularly arrests and 
citations—along with paperwork and 
documentation.” As well, traditional supervisors 
are more likely to punish, rather than reward,  
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and their ultimate concern is controlling 
subordinate behaviour. 
 
Innovative supervisors tend to form 
relationships and have more positive views of 
subordinates. They are not very task orientated 
but generally encourage new police methods and 
philosophies, like community policing and problem 
solving efforts, through coaching, mentoring, and 
facilitating. Innovative supervisors are more 
likely to delegate decision making, rather than 
take over situations, and are less concerned with 
enforcing rules and regulations than the 
traditional supervisor.   
 
Supportive supervisors provide inspiration and 
protect subordinates from unfair discipline and 
criticism. They “are less concerned with 
enforcing rules and regulations, dealing with 
paperwork, or ensuring that officers do their 
work. They may encourage officers through 
praise and recognition, act as counsellors, or 
display concern for subordinates’ personal and 
professional well-being.” 
 
Active supervisors perform a dual role—street 
officer and supervisor. They are heavily involved 
in field operations, engage in patrol work 
themselves, and embrace a philosophy of leading 
by example. “These supervisors attempt to 
strike a balance between being active in the field 
and controlling subordinate behaviour through 
constant, direct supervision. Supervisors with an 
active style are characterized by directive 
decision making, a strong sense of supervisory 
power, and a relatively positive view of 
subordinates”, but are sometimes viewed as 
micromanagers.  
 
The study found that active supervisors had the 
most influence over patrol officer behaviour, 
including: 
 
• Less time per shift on administrative tasks; 
• More time per shift on problem solving and 
other community-policing activities; 
• More time per shift on proactive activities; 
and 
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• Subordinates are twice as likely to use force 
against suspects. 
 
The number of arrests or citations was not 
affected by supervisory style. Rather, the longer 
a supervisor was on scene, the more likely an 
arrest was to occur. 
 
As the study noted, “An ‘active’ supervisory 
style—involving leading by example—seems to be 
the most influential despite potential drawbacks. 
Indeed, active supervisors appear to be crucial 
to the implementation of organizational goals.” 
 
A complete copy of this report is available from 
the U.S. Department of Justice website at 
www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/194078.pdf. 
 
FORCING LAWYER RISKS 
ADMISSIBILITY OF BTA 
CERTIFICATE 
R. v. Hesketh, 2003 BCPC 173 
 
A police officer arrested the 
accused for impaired driving 
and read him his s.10 Charter 
rights, the breathalyzer 
demand, and police warning. He 
acknowledged understanding and was 
transported to the police station where he was 
asked if he wanted to contact a lawyer. He 
replied, “Don’t need one. No way. No breath 
samples, period.” The officer asked again 
whether he wanted a lawyer and the accused 
replied, “What’s he going to do for me?”, while 
shaking his head negatively. A call was 
nevertheless made to legal aid and he was placed 
alone in a telephone room to speak to counsel. 
Two breath samples were subsequently obtained. 
The time taken between arrival at the station 
and the first sample of breath, including the 
time necessary to facilitate contact with 
counsel, was about half an hour. 
 
The accused was charged with impaired driving 
and over 80mg%. At his trial in British Columbia 
Provincial Court the accused argued that he had 
twice unequivocally, once by words and once by 
gesture, indicated he did not want to speak to a 
lawyer. In his view, the police did not respect his 
decision not to exercise his right to counsel and 
therefore, by taking the time to facilitate 
contact with a lawyer, did not take his breath 
samples as soon as practicable as required by the 
breath demand section of the Criminal Code. 
 
Justice Lenaghan agreed. He found the officer 
acted contrary to the clearly expressed decision 
of the accused and unjustifiably delayed the 
taking of the breath samples. Although the 
officer was acting in good faith by trying to act 
in the accused’s best interests, “the right to 
counsel is an individual constitutional right and 
that the decision to exercise it or not to 
exercise it is one that is exclusively that of the 
subject individual. It cannot be appropriated by 
another person, regardless of how well-
intentioned that other person might be”, ruled 
the judge. The certificate of qualified technician 
was excluded as evidence because the breath 
samples were not taken as soon as practicable. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
CANINE USE VIOLATES 
CHARTER 
R. v. Yuen, 2003 ABQB 776 
 
The accused, a suspect in 
transporting drugs, arrived at 
the Calgary airport on a flight 
from Vancouver. Police 
surveilled him as he departed the plane and he 
was eventually approached when he exited the 
departures level at the airport. He was asked for 
his plane ticket while a police dog sniffed his 
carry-on baggage that he had placed on the 
ground. The dog made a positive indication for 
narcotics on the bag and also showed an interest 
in the accused himself. He was arrested and 
provided his Charter right to counsel, but 
nothing was found in his bag. Police did, though, 
locate 495 grams of cocaine wrapped in plastic 
around the accused’s midsection. He was charged 
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with possession of cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
 
At his trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s 
Bench, the accused argued that his rights under 
the Charter had been infringed. Justice Phillips 
found that the police had detained the accused 
when he was stopped and asked for his ticket. 
However, this detention was lawful for an 
investigative purpose. The police had an 
articulable cause to detain him based on the 
information they had on him and his subsequent 
activities after arriving at the airport.   
 
The warrantless dog sniff however, was an 
unreasonable search under s.8 of the Charter. 
“The police…may conduct a brief, minimally 
intrusive detention, such as asking to see one’s 
plane ticket…but the law does not go so far as to 
their using a drug detection dog to search for 
contraband (such as drugs), where there is no 
concern of officer safety,” said the judge. 
Without the dog sniff, the police did not have 
reasonable grounds to arrest. Therefore, the 
arrest was tainted and the common law power of 
searching incident to arrest could not be used to 
justify the finding of the drugs. Despite the 
Charter breach, the evidence was nonetheless 
admitted under s.24(2) because its admission 
would not bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute.  
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
ASD DELAY REASONABLE, BUT 
DEPENDS ON CIRCUMSTANCES 
R. v. Ritchie, 2004 SKCA 9 
  
The police stopped the accused 
when he made a turn from the 
wrong lane and slowed to a near 
stop at a green light. He had an 
odour of alcohol on his breath, slurred speech, 
and was unsteady on his feet. A police officer 
demanded he provide a sample of his breath into 
an approved screening device (ASD) under 
s.254(2) of the Criminal Code, but had to radio 
for one to be brought to the scene. During this 
contact, the accused was uncooperative and 
made repeated demands as to his “options”. It 
took 11 minutes for the screening device to 
arrive, but the accused refused to provide a 
sample. He was arrested, told of his right to a 
lawyer, and charged with impaired driving and 
failing to provide a breath sample.  
 
At his trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the 
accused was acquitted of the impaired driving 
charge but was convicted of failing to provide a 
sample. He argued that the 11 minute delay while 
waiting for the arrival of the ASD did not 
comply with the requirement that the sample be 
taken “forthwith”. The judge disagreed, 
concluding that “forthwith” does not mean 
immediately. In his view, the section allows for 
some flexibility and the police acted in good 
faith. However, the conviction was overturned by 
the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench. The 
Queen’s Bench justice interpreted the word 
“forthwith” to mean immediately—thus the police 
did not comply with the demand section. 
Furthermore, she ruled the delay provided an 
opportunity for the accused to be advised of his 
right to counsel while they waited for the ASD 
to arrive, or alternatively, the police could have 
transported him to the station for an intoxilyzer 
test, which was only 2 blocks away. The Crown 
appealed to Saskatchewan’s top court. 
 
In a unanimous judgment, the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal reinstated the conviction. After 
reviewing case law, Justice Sherstobitoff found 
the word “forthwith” was not synonymous with 
“immediately”. Rather, it means “as soon as 
possible”, which will depend on the all 
circumstances. Included in these circumstances 
is whether “there is any realistic possibility that 
the subject could successfully contact counsel 
and get legal advice.” In this case, the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal ruled it was open 
to the trial judge to conclude that the 11-minute 
delay from the time the demand was made until 
the ASD arrival was reasonable and satisfied the 
meaning of forthwith. As for advising the 
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accused of his right to counsel, the court noted 
that there was no means available at the scene 
by which the accused could communicate with a 
lawyer. Taking him to the station for an 
intoxilyzer test, as suggested by the Queen’s 
Bench justice, was also not an option. An ASD 
demand only requires a reasonable suspicion, but 
an intoxilyzer demand requires reasonable and 
probable grounds for which, absent an ASD 
result, there was no evidence.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
PRIVACY NOT BREACHED BY 
PRESENCE OF VIDEO CAMERA 
R. v. Cairns, 
(2004) Docket:C39952 (OntCA) 
 
The accused failed a roadside 
screening test and was taken to 
the police detachment for a 
breath sample. After police 
arranged contact with duty counsel, she was 
placed in the holding cell area equipped with a 
video camera and spoke in private for three to 
five minutes. The camera was not capable of 
recording audio and was not on when the accused 
was in the room, but she was not told of this. 
Subsequently. She provided two breath samples 
of 138mg% and was charged.  
 
At her trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, the 
accused argued that her right to counsel under 
s.10(b) of the Charter had been violated. 
Although she did not testify that the camera’s 
presence affected her conversation with duty 
counsel, she did say she believed the police were 
watching and listening to her. The judge 
concluded that the accused had not satisfied the 
constitutional burden in establishing she was not 
given privacy. In his view, there was no evidence 
the camera was on, that the police were 
watching, or that her conversation could be 
overheard. Her appeal to the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice was dismissed, but she appealed 
further to the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
 
Ontario’s highest court affirmed the earlier 
judgments and dismissed the appeal.  The right 
to counsel under s.10 of the Charter includes the 
right to privacy during the conversation with a 
lawyer. In this case, there was no actual breach 
of the accused’s privacy—the police could not 
and did not overhear her speaking with duty 
counsel. However, that does not end the enquiry. 
It is nonetheless possible to establish a breach, 
if the accused could satisfy the court that she 
reasonably believed, based on the circumstances, 
that she could not consult with a lawyer in 
private.  
 
In this case, the presence of the camera by 
itself was insufficient to establish a perceived 
breach. The accused did not ask about the 
status of the camera nor tell the police that she 
had concerns about her privacy. Duty counsel did 
not complain and she did not suggest that her 
communication with counsel was hampered. The 
Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the trial 
judge that the accused failed to satisfy the 
burden, on a balance of probabilities, that her 
right to counsel was infringed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
PRISONER’s PRIVACY IN 
EFFECTS GREATLY REDUCED 
R. v. Blais,  
(2004) Docket:C38311 (OntCA) 
 
The accused was arrested  by 
police and held at a detention 
centre. His personal effects 
were seized by jail staff and 
placed in a sealed, but transparent plastic bag. 
Sometime later, a detective went to the 
detention center and viewed the accused’s 
belongings without opening the bag. He saw a 
key, which resembled another key taken from 
one of his co-accused that opened the door to a 
residence where stolen property was found. The 
detective returned a second time, compared the 
key again without opening the bag, and satisfied 
himself it was likely the same key. A search 
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warrant was subsequently obtained and the key 
was seized. The key, which formed part of the 
overall evidence, was admitted and the accused 
was convicted in Ontario’s Superior Court of 
Justice.  
 
The accused appealed his conviction to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that 
the two warrantless inspections of his effects 
amounted to unreasonable searches and tainted 
the search warrant used to obtain the key. In his 
view, the evidence should have been excluded 
under s.24(2) of the Charter.  
 
The existence and degree of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy depends on the “totality 
of the circumstances”, including presence at the 
time of search, possession or control, ownership, 
or historical use of the property or place 
searched, ability to regulate access to the place, 
and the reasonableness of any subjective 
expectation. In dismissing the appeal on behalf 
of the court, Justice Rosenberg concluded that 
once the accused’s belongings had been lawfully 
seized by correctional authorities, his privacy 
expectation in those items was greatly reduced. 
He stated: 
 
[The accused’] expectation of privacy was that 
the state would preserve the goods and return 
them to him upon his release. He could not 
reasonably expect that agents of the state 
would not inspect those goods, although he 
could expect that the police would obtain a 
search warrant before actually taking them 
out of the possession of the gaoler who was 
under a duty to safeguard them. This is 
exactly what [the police] did in this case and I 
therefore see no violation of s. 8. 
 
Moreover, even if there was a breach of the 
accused’s privacy expectation, the court ruled the 
evidence was nonetheless admissible because the 
officer acted in good faith and tried to comply 
with the law. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
STRIP SEARCHES: 
UNCOVERING THE BARE 
ESSENTIALS1 
 
Personal searches of 
arrestees vary by degree 
of intrusiveness. They 
range from pat down or 
frisk searches, through 
strip searches, to body 
cavity searches. They do 
not, however, go so far 
as to justify the forced seizure of bodily 
samples from persons2. Like many Charter issues, 
there are competing interests. With personal 
searches the privacy interest of the individual 
collides with law enforcement’s interest in 
finding evidence and ensuring safety.  
 
As a general rule, the more intrusive or affront 
to human dignity that a search is, the greater 
the objective justification required. Moreover, 
the police must minimize the interference 
necessary to achieve their goals commensurate 
with respecting the privacy and dignity of the 
individual by conducting the strip search in a 
reasonable manner.  
 
What is a Strip Search? 
 
In R. v. Golden 2001 SCC 83, the Supreme Court 
of Canada adopted the following definition of a 
“strip search”: 
 
[T]he removal or rearrangement of some or all 
of the clothing of a person so as to permit a 
visual inspection of a person’s private areas, 
namely genitals, buttocks, breasts (in the case 
of female), or undergarments. 
 
Not all removal of clothing, however, will amount 
to a “strip search”. For example, in R. v. 
Kitaitchik, (2002) Docket: C32740 (OntCA), the 
Ontario Court of Appeal reviewed police action in 
seizing the accused’s clothing for a murder 
                                                 
1 A similar article has appeared in both the Blue Line (February 2004) and The 
Thin Blue Line (Vol. 3 Issue 2) publications. 
2 R. v. Stillman [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.) 
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investigation. The day after his arrest, the 
accused was told to remove all of his clothing and 
he was immediately given a fresh set of his own 
clothing. The seizure occurred in a private room 
with only one other person present, no force or 
intimidation was used, and no attempt was made 
to examine his body. While reviewing the trial 
judge’s admission of the clothing under s.24(2) of 
the Charter, Justice Doherty found that the 
accused had not been strip searched as described 
in Golden. He stated, “While the seizure of his 
clothing was clearly an intrusive act, it was not 
akin to stripping him for the purpose of viewing or 
examining his most private areas.” 
 
Can an Arrestee be Strip Searched?  
 
Strip searches can properly be conducted as an 
incident to arrest. However, although a search 
incidental to arrest does not generally require 
reasonable grounds beyond the grounds necessary 
to support the arrest, a strip search is an 
exception to this common law rule. Strip searches 
represent a significant invasion of privacy, and 
are often humiliating, degrading, and traumatic 
experiences. Before undertaking a strip search, 
the police must possess reasonable grounds to 
warrant the search independent from the 
grounds justifying the arrest.  Strip searches 
carried out as a matter of routine or policy, 
abusively, or for the purpose of humiliating or 
punishing the arrestee will be unreasonable.  
 
The Golden Nuggets 
 
In Golden the police strip searched the accused 
in a sandwich shop after he was arrested for 
making a drug transaction. He had initially 
resisted the efforts of the police to remove 10 
grams of crack cocaine contained in a plastic 
wrap that he was holding between his buttocks 
by flexing his muscles. He was eventually forced 
to lie face down on the floor with his pants and 
underwear pulled down to his knees. After 
Golden accidentally defecated, an officer was 
able to remove the drugs when Golden relaxed 
his buttocks. He was transported to the police 
station where he was again strip searched. 
Golden was convicted at trial of possession of a 
narcotic for the purpose of trafficking, a 
decision upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
However, on further appeal the Supreme Court 
of Canada found the search unreasonable and a 
violation of Golden’s rights under s.8 of the 
Charter to be secure against unreasonable 
search and seizure. 
 
As a result of this case, the following principles 
concerning strip searches emerged: 
 
¾ The common law power to search incidental 
to arrest does include the power to strip 
search.  
 
¾ Although permissible as an incident to 
arrest, strip searches are presumptively 
unreasonable and the onus lies on the police 
to justify the strip search. 
 
¾ Strip searches must be conducted in a 
reasonable manner. The physical manner or 
method of the search must be carried out in 
a just and proper fashion. The search must 
not be abusive and the scope of the intrusion 
must be proportionate to the objectives of 
the search and other circumstances of the 
situation. In deciding whether the manner in 
which a strip search was conducted meets 
the constitutional requirements of s.8 of the 
Charter, the following questions provide 
guidance: 
 
• Was the search conducted at the police 
station, if not, why? 
• Was the health and safety of all involved 
ensured? 
• Was the search authorized by a 
supervisor? 
• Was the officer the same gender as the 
arrestee? 
• Was the number of officers involved in 
the search reasonable? 
• Was the minimum force necessary used? 
• Was the search conducted in private so 
others could not observe? 
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• Was the search conducted as quickly as 
possible? 
• Was the search conducted in a fashion 
that ensures a person is not completely 
undressed at any one time? 
• Was the search only a visual inspection 
or was there physical contact? 
• Was the arrestee provided the option of 
self-removal or medical assistance if a 
weapon or evidence is observed in a body 
cavity? 
• Was a proper record of the reasons and 
manner of search kept? 
 
¾ Strip searches are inherently humiliating and 
degrading regardless of the manner in which 
they are conducted and therefore cannot be 
carried out as a matter of routine or policy. 
Strip searches performed routinely or under 
policy will not be rendered reasonable unless 
there is a compelling reason justified in the 
circumstances.  
 
¾ There is a distinction between strip searches 
on arrest and strip searches related to 
safety in full custodial settings, such as a 
prison. The appropriateness of routine strip 
searches of individuals entering into a prison 
population cannot be used to justify strip 
searches of individuals briefly detained by 
police or held overnight in cells. Although 
police officers have legitimate concerns that 
short-term detainees may conceal weapons, 
these concerns cannot justify routine strip 
searches of all arrestees regardless of the 
particular circumstances surrounding the 
arrest and must be addressed on a case-by-
case basis. 
 
¾ Strip searches are to be generally conducted 
at a police station except in cases of exigent 
circumstances where the police have 
reasonable grounds to believe that the 
search is necessary in the field such as an 
urgency to search for weapons that could be 
used to harm the officer, others, or the 
arrestee. 
¾ A person should be provided the opportunity 
to remove items themselves or the 
assistance or advice of trained medical 
professionals should be sought to ensure 
material can be safely removed. 
 
¾ When the reasonableness of a strip search is 
challenged, the Crown (police) bears the onus 
of proving on a balance of probabilities that 
it was warranted: 
 
• In the case of strip searches in the 
field, the police must demonstrate 
reasonable grounds to both justify the 
arrest and the strip search, exigent 
circumstances, and that the search was 
conducted in a reasonable manner. 
 
• In the case of strip searches at the 
police station, the police must 
demonstrate reasonable grounds to both 
justify the arrest and  the strip search, 
and that the search was conducted in a 
reasonable manner. Exigent 
circumstances need not be proven. 
 
Following the Golden Thread 
 
How has the reasoning in Golden since been 
applied? What follows are a number of recent 
cases where courts have considered the 
Supreme Court of Canada’ s judgment.  
 
In R. v. B.B., 2002 BCCA 388, the accused 
appealed his conviction after a police officer 
detained him driving a motor vehicle under the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and 
conducted a strip search by asking him to take 
down his pants and underwear. He remained 
seated in the car in a very dark area where 
there was little traffic and the officer stood in 
the open door of the car between the accused 
and anyone who may come by. The officer found 
a plastic baggie containing nine flaps of cocaine 
in the accused’s genital area.  
 
The officer testified he conducted the strip 
search in this fashion because (1) if the 
information had turned out to be incorrect, the 
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accused would be on his way and would not have 
to be taken down to the station to be searched, 
(2) it was very busy and there was a limited 
number of officers working, and  (3) the need to 
protect the evidence from possible destruction 
by the accused during the drive to the station. 
In ruling that the accused’s s.8 Charter right 
had been violated, the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal stated:  
 
[T]he reasons [the officer] gave for strip 
searching [the accused] at the scene, rather 
than at the police station did not meet the 
requirements for a lawful strip search as an 
incident of arrest set forth in Golden.  It 
cannot be justification for a strip search in 
the field that, if the search turns out to be 
negative, the citizen searched can then go on 
his or her way.  This rationale suggests that a 
strip search is really a way of doing detained 
citizens a favour by saving them a possible 
trip to the police station.  I think it is fair to 
say that the majority of citizens would 
rather be spared the favour.  In fact, the 
evidence here is to the effect that [the 
officer] was motivated by the desire to save 
himself a trip to the police station, if 
possible, in order to avoid the time and paper 
work which such a trip would involve.  Had 
there been evidence of a significant need for 
his services at the time of this arrest, 
beyond the usual requirements of patrol duty, 
that would have been a valid consideration in 
determining whether exigent circumstances 
existed which justified a search in the field.  
There was, however, no such evidence of 
exigent circumstances here.  Further, there 
is no evidence of a concern that [the accused] 
might be armed; nor is there any persuasive 
evidence that [the accused] could have 
disposed of the cocaine while being taken 
from his car to the police station.  
Presumably he would have been handcuffed in 
such a manner as to prevent him from 
removing anything from his pants.  He would 
also have been in the custody of [the officer] 
and in the company of the ride-along, who 
could have kept him under observation for 
the short drive to the police station. 
 
However, the evidence was admitted under 
s.24(2) because the police protected the 
accused’s privacy interest as best they could 
under the circumstances and did not have the 
benefit of Golden at the time. 
 
In Ilnicki v. MacLeod, 2003 ABQB 465, the 
plaintiff brought an action against the police 
alleging his Charter rights were violated, 
including a s.8 breach when he was strip 
searched. The plaintiff had been arrested by 
police on an unendorsed warrant for no 
insurance. He was taken to the police station 
where he was subjected to a strip search, which 
he resisted. A wrist lock was applied and the 
accused subsequently sustained a strain to his 
arm. Although the arrest was lawful, Justice 
Acton found the strip search unnecessary and 
unreasonable in the circumstances. The 
plaintiff’s custody was a short term detention 
like the type mentioned in Golden. Furthermore, 
the use of force was inappropriate. No other 
alternative actions were attempted, like warning 
him first that force would be applied if he did 
not cooperate, telling him he would have to stay 
in the search room until he complied, or 
consulting with the sergeant about how to gain 
compliance. As a result, the plaintiff was 
awarded $5,000 for the indignities of the strip 
search and $6,000 for the arm strain. 
 
In R. v. Pringle, 2003 ABPC 7, the accused was 
arrested following his erratic driving and for 
evading police. He was transported to the police 
station where he deliberately avoided providing a 
breath sample so the 2-hour limit would expire. 
He allegedly struck a police officer and was sent 
to the Edmonton Police Service downtown 
division where he was routinely strip searched 
and lodged in a holding cell until his release, 
rather than being released as originally intended. 
The accused was charged with impaired driving, 
refusal, failing to stop for police, and assaulting 
a police officer. Relying on Golden, Justice 
Lefever ruled that an arbitrary policy for 
conducting strip searches without information 
that the detainee may be carrying drugs or a 
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weapon is unjustified. In this case, the accused 
was sent downtown to teach him a lesson and 
punish and humiliate him by subjecting him to a 
degrading strip search. It was “high handed and 
without lawful justification” and a “gross abuse 
of the police power of detention”. The accused 
was acquitted of all charges. 
 
In R. v. Dispersio, [2003] O.J. No. 2917 (OntCJ), 
the accused was arrested after he failed a 
roadside screening device. He was transported 
to the police station where he also failed 
breathalyzer tests. Since he refused to provide 
his correct address and indicated that he would 
not attend court, he was taken to the police 
detention facility. While there, he was strip 
searched by an officer prior to being lodged in 
cells where he would be held for a bail hearing. 
The officer conceded that he had no specific 
reasons to suspect drugs or weapons were 
concealed and testified that he did the search 
for safety reasons because of his own individual 
practice, not as part of any departmental policy. 
The accused undressed himself and was never 
completely without clothes. Justice Takach 
found it difficult to distinguish between short-
term detainees and those entering a larger 
prison population. In the judge’s view, the 
concern for prisoner and officer safety is 
identical for both short term and long term 
custody and the failure to search temporarily 
detained individuals creates the same danger. 
“As an aside, whether lodged for short term or 
long term, there is a significant public interest in 
protecting a suspect not just from others, 
including other inmates and those in authority, 
but as well from the suspect himself. It is not 
unknown that prisoners lodged for a short term 
have harmed themselves or even taken their own 
lives”, said the judge. In this case the search 
was held to be reasonable.  
 
In R. v. Agostinelli, [2002] O.J. No. 5008 
(OntCJ), the accused was arrested for impaired 
driving and transported to the police station for 
breathalyzer samples. After providing two 
samples, the accused was strip searched in a 
hallway in the presence of two officers, without 
being told why. The area of the search was not 
private and one where others might see what was 
happening. Although he was not touched by the 
police, he lowered his pants and underwear and 
made a complete turn. However, there were no 
reasonable grounds the accused had concealed 
weapons, evidence, or instruments. The judge 
found that the police were following a rule that 
all persons be stripped before being lodged in a 
cell. As a result, the court concluded there was 
no compelling reason for the search and that it 
was not reasonable.  The search took on an 
element of punishment; designed to humiliate, 
demean, and intimidate. The accused’s charges 
were stayed.  
 
In R. v. Keewatin, 2003 ABPC 67, the accused 
was arrested on an outstanding provincial 
warrant  for being drunk in a public place. He was 
subjected to a cursory search, handcuffed, 
transported to the police station, and placed in a 
holding cell. The female officer decided to send 
the accused to the downtown detention facility 
for a bail hearing, but first had him submit to a 
strip search before a male officer for safety 
reasons. The search took place in the accused’s 
cell and he was asked to remove his clothes. 
During this process, the officer saw a bulge the 
size of a golf ball containing crack cocaine in one 
of the accused’s socks. The strip search 
continued but no other contraband was found. 
Although the manner of the search was handled 
in an exemplary fashion, Justice McNab ruled 
that it was nonetheless unreasonable. A more 
thorough hands-on, pat down search should have 
been conducted before jumping to the strip 
search. If this had occurred, the cocaine would 
have been found and at that point a strip search 
would have been far more defensible. Blindly 
following a policy without considering the 
particular circumstances of a case does not make 
the strip search either necessary or lawful. The 
cocaine was excluded as evidence. 
 
In R. v. Hornick, [2002] O.J. No. 1170 (OntCJ), 
five male police officers raided a private event 
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to conduct a liquor inspection where only women 
were gathered in varying states of undress to 
explore their sexuality. Two female undercover 
officers had earlier entered the premises and 
observed breaches of the provincial Liquor 
Licence Act. Justice Hryn concluded that the 
circumstances in this case were analogous to a 
strip search, even though the police did not ask 
the patrons to remove their clothing. Although 
the police had the authority to enter and 
conduct a liquor inspection, the way the police 
carried it out was unreasonable. Male officers 
were used when the attendees would reasonably 
expect that men would not be present. The 
police knew the patrons were in various stages of 
undress and there was no announcement or delay 
prior to entry, which would have allowed patrons 
to get their clothing. There was no urgency nor 
was there any attempt to have female police 
officers enter. As a result, all the evidence was 
excluded including the female undercover 
officers’ observations made before the police 
entry. 
 
In R. v. S.F. & J.L., [2003] O.J. No. 92 (OntCJ), 
two young offender females were arrested for a 
month old robbery after they attended the 
police station in company of their parents at the 
request of the police. Both girls were held for 
judicial release and subjected to the booking 
protocol that required a strip search to 
determine whether they were hiding any weapons 
or contraband. Up until this point no search, not 
even a minimally intrusive frisk search, had been 
conducted. The strip search was overseen by a 
female officer in an area designed to provide a 
measure of privacy, but was partially captured on 
surveillance videotape. The search screen 
intended to afford privacy was not high enough 
and the girls’ breasts and upper bodies were 
videoed. Nothing was found during the search. 
Justice Katarynych concluded that even though 
the police were concerned with safety, there 
were no reasonable grounds to believe that 
either girl posed a safety concern. The police 
response in this case did not reflect the specific 
circumstances that existed and the strip search 
was completely unnecessary. Furthermore, the 
manner in which the search was conducted was 
also unreasonable. Firstly, no pat-down search 
was conducted prior to the strip search. This 
left the girls more vulnerable than necessary 
because a frisk search may have been sufficient 
to address police concerns. Without it, the 
means to ascertain whether there was in fact a 
need for a more intrusive search was bypassed. 
Secondly, a portion of their naked body was 
captured on videotape, which resulted in 
“excruciating embarrassment”. Consequently, the 
charges were stayed. 
 
In R. v. A.B., [2003] O.J. No. 2010 (OntSCJ), the 
accused was arrested for forcible confinement 
and assault after police responded to a 911 call 
and found his wife tied up with tape on her mouth. 
He was frisk searched at the scene and 
transported to the police station where he was 
strip searched by a lone male officer in a small 
room as part of a routine procedure prior to being 
placed in the holding cells. He was also strip 
searched again at the courthouse the next 
morning. At his provincial court trial the judge 
found the first search reasonable without 
considering the distinction between persons held 
at the police station and those going to court or 
jail. The second courthouse search, however, was 
ruled unreasonable because it was long after the 
arrest and was not based on any particular 
concern linked to the accused. Despite this 
Charter breach the accused was convicted, but 
appealed arguing, in part, that the first strip 
search was also unreasonable. Appeal Justice 
Durno of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
concluded that the first search was conducted as 
a matter of routine or policy and found the judge 
erred in failing to distinguish between station 
house detentions and those entering a larger 
population. However, in applying Golden, the court 
was “not persuaded that one strip search of those 
who will be attending court cells, in itself, is 
unreasonable, provided the search is conducted in 
a reasonable manner.” The first strip search was 
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not unreasonable in this case, but the second 
routine strip search was without further 
justification. Nevertheless, the stay application 
was dismissed. 
 
In R. v. Clarke, Heroux, & Pilipa [2003] O.J. No. 
3884 (OntSCJ), the three accused were 
arrested for their involvement in a riot that 
occurred a month earlier when protesting 
demonstrators became violent and clashed with 
police. Clarke was arrested in the morning, and 
subjected to three separate strip searches—on 
arrival at the police station, later by 
investigators, and a third time when he could not 
make bail and was taken to the Toronto jail. Both 
Heroux and Pilipa were also arrested and strip 
searched at the police station. Nothing was 
found, but several breaches of the police strip 
search policy occurred, including no proper strip 
search reports and the complete removal of 
clothing. The accused brought an application for 
a stay of proceedings, in part, arguing that their 
s.8 Charter rights were violated when they were 
strip searched. Despite the absence of 
reasonable grounds to believe any of the three 
had weapons or drugs on them, Justice Ferrier 
found the strip searches conducted not per se 
unreasonable . They were conducted for the 
safety and security of the accused, the police, 
and other prisoners. He concluded that it would 
be rare when a strip search of a person entering 
a prison population, which he defined as persons 
reasonably expected to come in contact with 
others being detained by the state, would not be 
reasonable. The judge said, “The police could 
reasonably be concerned about an inadvertent 
introduction of a dangerous object into the 
police station. These concerns may not be 
satisfied even with a thorough pat-down search.” 
However, the police in this case did not keep 
proper records of the strip searches, did not 
allow removal of the clothing in stages, and the 
second and third searches of Clarke were clearly 
unjustified and unreasonable. Furthermore, the 
court found the detentions of the accused 
arbitrary because they were not brought before 
a justice as soon as practicable and could have 
been avoided had alternative means been 
considered, thereby eliminating the need for the 
strip searches altogether. Nevertheless, the 
request for a stay was rejected. 
 
In Peart & Grant v. Peel Police Services Board, 
[2003] O.J. No. 2669 (OntSCJ), two plaintiffs 
sued police following their arrest when they fled 
from a gas station in what was believed to be a 
stolen car. Among other issues, like racial 
profiling, the action claimed damages for 
assaults and indignities suffered as a result of 
breaches to their Charter rights, including strip 
searches. At trial, there was evidence that the 
general practice of the Peel police was to strip 
search all arrestees brought to the police 
station for safety reasons and to uncover 
evidence of any offence. Justice Lane found the 
searches to be reasonable. They were conducted 
shortly after the arrest at the police station in 
private with the view to protect the police and 
the prisoners or to find evidence. The police 
were investigating why the plaintiffs fled and 
“such a search could reasonably be expected to 
throw light on their sudden flight from the 
PetroCanada station by disclosing whether they 
had anything concealed on their persons which 
explained their conduct”, said the judge.  Here, 
the officers also conducted the searches in a 
reasonable manner. Although they were stripped 
entirely naked, it was only for a brief period. 
The police respected the privacy and dignity 
interests of the men under the circumstances 
and there was no body cavity search. The 
plaintiffs Charter rights were not violated by 
the strip searches and the action was ultimately 
dismissed. 
 
In R. v. Seenathsingh, (2002) O.J. No. 5010 
(OntCJ), the accused was arrested, while seated 
at a donut shop, for possession of marihuana. He 
was told to stand up and the officer saw that his 
pant zipper was down. This was consistent with 
the officer’s experience in previous arrests 
where suspects leave their zipper down to allow 
easy access to drugs kept in the underwear. A 
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brief pat down was conducted and a piece of 
crack cocaine was found in his jacket. The 
accused pushed the officer and tried to run 
away, but was unsuccessful. Enroute to the 
station, the officer noticed the accused 
fidgeting  in the back of the police car—a knife 
and some cocaine was found under the seat. He 
was booked in and strip searched resulting in a 
bottle of hashish oil and marihuana being found 
in his underwear. The accused argued at his trial 
that his Charter rights were violated. Justice 
Bovard, however, found the searches were 
lawfully carried out as an incident to the 
accused’s arrest and therefore did not infringe 
s.8. The accused was convicted. 
 
In R. v. Ferguson, [2003] O.J. No. 3242 (OntCJ), 
the accused was strip searched in the booking 
room with the doors closed after she provided 
breath samples of 220mg% and 205mg%, but 
before she was lodged in cells to sober up. Her 
private areas were never touched by the officer 
nor was she ever completely naked. The officer 
testified the search was conducted for safety 
reasons and to locate possible anti-depressant 
pills the accused was taking. Justice Baldwin 
found the search reasonable. Although there was 
nothing more than a mere suspicion that pills 
would be found, the search was justified on 
safety grounds. “It seems reasonable to me that 
a person being placed in the cells, even for a 
short duration, should not have weapons, even 
small ones like a razor blade, on their person,” 
said the judge. The accused was extremely 
intoxicated with volatile emotions, she lacked 
good judgment, and she was incapable of taking 
care of herself which all helped provide 
objective grounds to justify the strip search. 
Furthermore, metal detectors were not being 
used by the police service at the time, which may 
now be a major factor in subsequent strip 
searches ruled the judge.  Even though the 
officer failed to properly document the search 
as required by Golden, this was insufficient, in 
the judge’s view, to render the search 
unreasonable. The stay application was rejected 
and the breath samples were admissible. 
 
In R. v. Douglas, 2003 BCPC 392, the accused 
was strip searched at the Vancouver police 
lockup following her arrest where she resisted 
the efforts of police officers to restrain her 
during an alcohol involved traffic stop. At the 
lockup, the accused refused to submit to the 
search, but complied when an officer pulled out 
her handcuffs as if she would force the search. 
She was directed to take off all her clothing, 
turn around, bend over, spread her cheeks, and 
cough. At the time, the jail had a policy to strip 
search all detainees except bylaw offenders or 
those in custody for being drunk in public to be 
released when sober. Justice Bruce found the 
arrest and subsequent pat down search lawful. 
Furthermore, upon entering the Vancouver jail, 
corrections staff continue to have the authority 
to search incidental to arrest for general safety 
purposes including strip searches when a 
detainee is mixed with the general prison 
population. However, this does not include the 
right to strip search persons where the officer 
in charge has not yet decided to detain in 
custody. A blanket strip search policy with 
respect to these persons is not justified. Rather, 
the searching officer requires proper grounds to 
warrant the strip search—mere suspicion is not 
enough. Factors to consider include the person’s 
history of secreting weapons or contraband, and 
their criminal record or demeanor, like violent 
behaviour. In this case, there were proper 
grounds for corrections personnel to be 
concerned with their safety. The accused was 
violent, had been fighting, and was to be charged 
with assault. However, despite possessing the 
requisite grounds for the search, it was not 
conducted in a reasonable manner. The search 
was not carried out in private—the window of 
the cell was open. The accused was entirely 
disrobed, rather than having her clothes 
removed in stages. And finally, when the accused 
initially refused to submit to the search, a 
corrections officer implied force when she 
 Volume 4 Issue 2             www.jibc.bc.ca 
March/April 2004 
15
presented her handcuffs. Despite these 
concerns, a stay of proceedings was not 
warranted. 
 
Interestingly, Justice Bruce went one step 
further and ruled that when prisoners object to 
a strip search an additional right to counsel is 
triggered. No case law was cited to support this 
contention even though the Supreme Court of 
Canada has previously ruled that the right to 
counsel derives from arrest or detention, not 
from the fact of being searched (R. v. Debot 
(1989), 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.)) It will be 
interesting to see if this line of reasoning is 
accepted by other judges. It seems unlikely that 
an additional right to a lawyer would be engaged 
only if the detainee objects to the strip search. 
Surely, if there is any right at all, as suggested 
by Justice Bruce, it should be duly afforded to 
all persons the police seek to submit to a strip 
search, regardless of whether they object or 
not. 
 
The Bare Essentials 
 
As a result of reviewing these cases a few basic 
tenets appear to develop. The common law power 
to strip search a person incidental to an arrest 
requires the following: 
 
• a lawful arrest (the police had reasonable 
grounds); 
• the search must be truly incidental (or 
connected) to the arrest; 
o safety; and/or 
o evidence 
• the police must have reasonable grounds to 
justify the strip search independent from 
the grounds for the arrest itself; and 
• the strip search must be conducted in a 
reasonable manner. 
 
As a matter of practice, officers must feel 
comfortable and be proficient at conducting 
thorough pat down searches. A proper pat down 
may provide the necessary grounds to justify a 
strip search. For example, while frisking a person 
an unnatural bulge is detected. This may then 
provide a foundation on which to justify a more 
intrusive strip search.  Moreover, police agencies 
need to consider metal detectors. Again, a 
positive reading on such an instrument may 
provide the police with the necessary grounds to 
initiate a strip. Remember as well, the definition 
of a strip search accepted by the Supreme Court 
of Canada involves the visual inspection of the 
private areas or undergarments. Asking someone 
to remove their hat, take off a bulky jacket, or 
kick off their shoes, would not appear to be 
captured by this definition. And don’t forget to 
document, document, document. Keep current 
and stay safe!!!   
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ARRESTEE MUST BE DILIGENT 
IN TALKING TO LAWYER 
R. v. Wilford,  
(2004) Docket:C40169 (OntCA) 
 
The accused was arrested for 
impaired driving after he was 
found standing beside a vehicle 
driven into a ditch with the 
keys in the ignition, given the 
breath demand, read his right to counsel, 
cautioned, and asked if he wished to speak to a 
lawyer. He answered, “I’ll blow first”. The 
arresting officer believed this meant the 
accused would speak to a lawyer after he 
provided breath samples. 
 
In between the two breath samples, the 
breathalyzer technician asked several questions. 
The accused admitted he had been driving, that 
he had three or four beers prior to the accident, 
and performed three sobriety tests at the 
officer’s request. Following the tests, the 
accused did not renew his request to speak to a 
lawyer, but rather indicated he wanted to go 
home. 
 
The accused testified at his trial in the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice. He said that by 
stating he would blow first, he was postponing 
his right to counsel but should not have been 
asked any questions by the technician. Thus, he 
suggested, his answers to the questions were a 
violation of his s.10(b) Charter right. The trial 
judge found no Charter breach and admitted the 
evidence, but the accused appealed to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal. In dismissing the 
appeal, the court stated: 
 
The test for waiver of a Charter right is a 
strict one and that…"the standard required 
for an effective waiver of the right is very 
high". It is also well established that once a 
detainee states that he or she does wish to 
consult counsel, the police must "hold-off" 
and refrain from questioning the detainee 
until the right to counsel has been 
satisfied…Having heard the [accused’s] 
response "I'll blow first", and in view of the 
importance of the right to counsel, it might 
have been more prudent for the police to 
have warned the [accused] that the 
technician might ask him to answer some 
questions or to perform certain sobriety 
tests. However, since a detainee must be 
"reasonably diligent" in asserting the right to 
counsel…we are not persuaded that the trial 
judge erred in law in finding that the 
[accused] had waived his right to counsel, 
particularly in light of the [accused’s] 
admission on cross-examination that he did 
not intend to actually speak to a lawyer "until 
after you completed the first blow, sobriety 
test, the conversation and the second blow". 
[para. 10, references omitted] 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
MEDIATION SKILLS FOR THE 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
SUPERVISOR 
Kevin M. Gilmartin, Ph.D. 
 
The services that any 
organization may request of 
it's supervisory personnel 
can be quite varied. Often 
times Supervisors/ 
Commanders are called upon 
to assist in an on-going 
conflict within the work place. These conflicts 
can take various forms including conflicts 
between two coworkers—a coworker and a 
supervisor—and on occasion a coworker and a 
citizen. The use of Supervisory individuals to 
resolve these conflicts appears a logical decision 
many times by the appropriate management 
authority, however it can lead to a good 
supervisory individual very quickly "getting in 
over their head". This requires the Supervisory 
employee to appreciate the basic difference 
between mediating a conflict and providing 
support services to employees effected by a 
conflict. One is primarily a counselor role, that 
of helping people deal with their thoughts and 
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feelings about a conflict and attempting to 
minimize the emotional dysfunction that can be a 
product of a workplace conflict. The other role 
is that of mediator.  
 
The mediator's role is to create a process 
whereby the conflict is eliminated and the 
effected parties learn functional conflict 
resolution skills in addition to solving the present 
problem at hand. Although the role of both 
counselor and mediator have similar appearance 
at first glance they are essentially different 
processes with different outcomes and means to 
obtain their respective goals.  
 
Supervisors/Commanders must clearly 
appreciate the differences and at all times be 
quite certain of which "hat they are wearing". It 
is also imperative that the supervisory person 
wears only "one hat". An individual cannot begin a 
relationship with an individual as a counsellor-
type, discover a conflict and begin assuming the 
role of a mediator. A mediator has no vested 
interest in the benefit to either party in a 
conflict. A mediator's role is for the benefit of 
both individuals by creating conflict resolution. 
The mediator is neither negotiator, which would 
be attempting to benefit one side in a resolution, 
nor arbitrator, which is to weight the evidence 
by both sides and impose a solution. The 
mediator creates a setting whereby the parties 
resolve their own conflict with a mutually agreed 
upon solution.  
 
Studies have demonstrated that the majority of 
Americans feel that the number one ranked 
source of emotional stress in their life is 
created by conflicts in their individual 
workplace. Providing a process whereby these 
conflicts are handled appropriately and 
effectively not only creates significantly more 
productive workplaces, but if the studies on 
stress are accurate, it produces personal lives 
that are more fulfilled and less reflective of 
strain and distress carried home from the work 
environment. The organization and all individual 
parties concerned benefit from conflict 
mediation. 
 
Supervisors/Commanders functioning as a 
mediator need to realize that conflict within a 
work group in and of itself is not necessarily 
destructive or dysfunctional. Conflict, if handled 
correctly, can be quite constructive. It can 
signify a need for healthy change and can be the 
impetus for growth of the organization. It can 
be an opportunity for the parties involved to 
directly and truthfully communicate 
expectations they hold for each other which in 
the past often times had not been directly 
expressed. This non-direct or less than candid 
communication between parties in the workplace 
is often times the source of many conflicts that 
grow far beyond the initiating cause. Competent 
mediation of conflict can assist in the creation 
of a positive work environment where creative 
problem solving can take place and emotional 
investment in the unit productivity can be 
emotionally safe. Conflict that goes unaddressed 
or is poorly managed can rapidly create an 
environment of distrust, covert conflict, clique 
development, and a generalized air of passive 
hostility that can destroy the working 
atmosphere. Dysfunctional conflict can have a 
work unit feeling at risk emotionally, producing 
only minimal output and on occasion exploding 
into uncontrollable emotional or physical rage. 
When coworkers are aware of an unaddressed 
conflict in the workplace they can be forced to 
"take sides" in the issue or spend critical work 
time attempting to avoid the conflict; time that 
should be spent attempting to increase the 
functioning of the work organization.  
 
The mediator needs to remember that conflict 
between people is, in itself, inevitable. It is not 
good or bad. The question is whether or not the 
conflict is competently mediated to become a 
functional situation or left to remain a 
dysfunctional entity within the workplace. "Good 
" workplaces like "Good" relationships or 
marriages are not determined by the presence 
or absence of conflicts, but by the presence or 
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absence of good conflict resolution and problem 
solving skills.  
 
Supervisors/Commanders need to remember 
that the goal of conflict mediation is quite 
different than the goal of other crisis 
intervention types of procedures. In crisis 
intervention the goal typically is to resolve an 
emotional issue by permitting ventilation of 
emotions and expression of perceptions. In 
conflict mediation, although some of the same 
goals appear to exist, the major goal is to 
resolve the conflict by having the conflicting 
parties engage in a process whereby each party 
hears the perception of the other party in clear, 
uninterrupted, behavioural terms. Unlike the 
counsellor or crisis intervention role of the 
supervisor, the mediator role requires a 
structured authority based format. The 
mediator must create the setting where the 
conflict can be resolved by each party being 
"Structured" to hear the perceptions of the 
individuals with whom they are having the 
dispute.  
 
Many times, conflicting parties, once they reach 
the point in the conflict of being more focused 
on the conflict than the workplace goals, lack the 
necessary communication tools to take the 
conflict one step further and bring it to 
resolution without assistance. The workers 
involved in a dysfunctional conflict begin going to 
great lengths to avoid the individuals with whom 
they have the conflict. This avoidance between 
the conflicting parties can grow to extreme 
isolation between the parties and facilitate the 
rapid development of an atmosphere of distrust 
and blame. The parties avoiding each other many 
times will take their perceived grievance to 
coworkers that are uninvolved in the dispute in a 
hope to create allies or receive support for their 
respective position in the conflict. Parties in 
dysfunctional conflicts are highly motivated to 
have coworkers perceive them as the reasonable 
individual who is basically a "victim" of the 
unreasonableness of the other disputant. 
Unaddressed, this type of conflict can leave 
coworkers feeling like they have to choose sides 
in a conflict situation. Although the conflict does 
not impact the uninvolved coworkers initially, as 
a dysfunctional conflict grows, the division in a 
work force can destroy the morale of a unit and 
increase feeling of burn-out, detachment, and 
overall apathy to the unit goals. Conflicts that 
have gone unresolved in a workplace have 
created situations that have ranged from 
economic destruction of a company or enterprise 
to the tragedy of episodes of workplace violence.  
 
Workers many times lack the necessary 
communication skills to address emotional issues 
in the workplace. Reacting emotionally to work 
issues can be seen as inappropriate for the work 
place. Workers and supervisors can both believe 
than any emotional interaction at work is 
inappropriate. "That's a personal issue, keep it 
out of the workplace"—this thinking does not 
permit the situation many times to be self-
resolving and subsequently suppressed feelings 
can lead to a continuum of emotionally driven 
conflict behaviours. The goal of the mediator is 
the creation of a setting, whereby each party 
hears the other conflicting party in it's entirety 
and at the same time has the opportunity to 
express their own beliefs, thoughts, and 
perceptions about the conflict situation.  
 
The mediator's ultimate goal however, is to have 
the parties involved generate a mutually agreed 
solution to the problem. The solution is one 
generated by the conflicting parties and not one 
suggested or imposed upon the disputing parties 
by the mediator. The solution is created by the 
conflicting parties, the environment that permits 
the solution to be generated by the conflicting 
parties is created by the mediator. The 
mediation process is different at this point from 
other interventions with which the 
supervisors/commanders might be familiar. It is 
not the mediator's role to make suggestions, 
provide emotional interpretations, or generally to 
"Solve the Problem". The mediator is basically a 
structurer of a situation and an instructor in 
providing the disputants a problem-solving 
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format, which is potentially available for future 
conflict situations.  
 
Mediation intervention basically revolves around 
a two-staged process. In the first stage the 
mediator has to obtain a thorough understanding 
of the issues and positions involved in the 
conflict. The second stage is the creation of a 
mutually agreed upon solution by the conflicting 
parties and the implementation of the agreed 
upon strategy for resolution. 
 
In attempting to obtain a thorough 
understanding of the conflict, the mediator 
needs to know not only what is taking place, but 
the degree of emotional intensity and 
subsequent dysfunctional behaviours that are 
being generated as a function of the conflict. 
 
To someone not personally involved in a long-
term dysfunctional conflict in the workplace, the 
issues may seem petty, however the emotional 
energy invested in such a conflict can have major 
implications. The mediator must obtain as much 
information concerning the situation as possible. 
The mediator at this point can be at an extreme 
disadvantage. Where can the mediator obtain 
information about the conflict? How does the 
mediator know if the "independent or neutral" 
sources of the information about the conflict 
are themselves not involved or influenced by the 
conflict or by their own beliefs about the 
conflict? The mediator that forms preconceived 
beliefs or projects their own values into a 
conflict situation places in jeopardy their 
effectiveness as neutral uninvolved facilitators 
of conflict resolution.  
 
Contamination by background information can 
impact a mediator through many sources. The 
mediator needs to remember in many 
organizations the informal pipeline or the formal 
chain or command both can be impacted by a 
conflict situation and have already chosen sides 
in the conflict. The information provided by 
these "Independent" parties may really only be 
an attempt consciously or unconsciously to 
communicate to the mediator the beliefs 
supporting their chosen side in the conflict. If a 
conflict situation is of a magnitude significant 
enough to require the services of a mediator, 
the chances are quite good the agency head 
requesting the mediation has already drawn some 
conclusions concerning the conflict and quite 
possibly is providing a biased background 
appraisal of the situation.  
The best source of information about a conflict 
is obtained directly from the conflicting parties. 
Hearing the beliefs, thoughts, and perceptions 
about a conflict can best be understood when 
the mediator hears them directly from the 
individual or individuals that hold the beliefs. 
The idea of speaking to the involved parties 
themselves is generally agreed with by the 
agency requesting the mediation with one caveat; 
"as long as they are seen separately". This is a 
time for extreme caution by the mediator. The 
mediator must create a setting, whereby each 
party can express their entire "side of the 
story" without being interrupted or drawn into a 
debate with their disputing coworker about the 
accuracy of any given point. The mediator has a 
choice to make at this point in the information 
gathering stage of an intervention. How does the 
mediator hear the complete "Side of the story" 
from each party? Commonsense would dictate 
that if the ultimate goal of the mediator were 
only to obtain the information about a conflict, 
the least difficult course of action would be to 
interview each party separately. This decision, 
although easiest in the short-term, usually 
creates an atmosphere destructive to the 
ultimate goal of the mediation. It is here that 
the mediator needs to appreciate that the 
ultimate goal of the intervention is the creation 
by the conflicting parties of a mutually agreed 
upon solution to the conflict. The mediator is not 
merely an investigator of the facts and beliefs, 
but an architect of the setting that permits the 
conflicting parties to resolve the conflict.  
 
In virtually every case the mediator makes a 
serious mistake by interviewing the conflicting 
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parties separately. Usually the decision to 
"Interview" the conflicting parties separately is 
rationalized using the logic of the crisis 
interventionist, who has different goals than the 
mediator of a conflict. The decision for separate 
interviewing is often times made for reasons, 
such as, it creates a less threatening 
environment, it permits each party a chance to 
speak their mind without fear of attack, it lets 
the interventionist create rapport with each 
party thus ultimately leading to a facilitated 
resolution. These beliefs, in support of the 
decision for separate interviewing of the 
conflicting parties, might very well be valid and 
accurate for the investigator trying to capture 
independent recollections and statements of a 
conflict, but actually can spell disaster to the 
mediator. The course of action for the mediator 
in almost every situation is to bring the 
conflicting parties together and to conduct all 
mediation relevant business in the presence of 
all involved principals. Structuring the mediation 
such that both parties must come together runs 
against the logic or game plan of most 
dysfunctional interactions. Those involved in a 
conflict many times would prefer to "speak 
about" the other party, as opposed to "speak 
with" the other party. 
 
The decision to interview the conflicting parties 
at the same time and in each other's presence 
creates the most significant initial challenge to 
the mediator and is in reality the central 
difference between mediational information 
gathering and that of an investigator or crisis 
interventionist.  
 
The mediator, in bringing the parties together, 
takes the "path of most resistance" initially, but 
is establishing a setting, whereby the ultimate 
resolution can occur. The decision to bring the 
parties together at the same time is based on an 
understanding of the dynamics behind 
dysfunctional conflict. The conflicting parties 
have been, in all likelihood, speaking about the 
conflict to everybody, but the party with whom 
they are having the conflict. The conflicting 
parties possibly have become proficient in 
portraying themselves as the "victims " of the 
behaviour of their adversary in the conflict. If 
the conflicting parties had the communication 
skills to approach each other and respectfully 
articulate their individual concerns while 
simultaneously respectfully listening to the 
concerns of the other party, by definition 
dysfunctional conflict would not exist. 
Respectful disagreement might possibly be 
present, but each party would speak and listen to 
the other party utilizing communication skills. 
That environment is self-correcting of 
disagreements and possesses none of the traits 
of the long-term dysfunctional conflict typified 
by avoidance, distrust, and solicitation of 
coworkers as allies to one respective side of the 
conflict or the other.  
 
By interviewing the conflicting parties 
separately the mediator permits the conflicting 
parties to continue to potentially engage in the 
dysfunctional behaviour of trying to "win over" 
the mediator to their "side" of the conflict. 
Independent interviewing also ignores the fact 
that the conflicting parties distrust each other, 
possibly intensely, and are left to draw the 
conclusion that the mediator is "taking sides" 
particularly by the party not interviewed first. 
Separate interviewing or speaking with one party 
in a dispute without the other present puts the 
mediator at significant risk of being perceived as 
compromised in terms of neutrality. It also 
permits the parties to continue utilizing the 
dysfunctional communication style that 
permitted the conflict to be created and 
maintained without previous resolution. Creating 
an environment of direct and truthful 
communication that permits resolution is the goal 
of the mediator. 
 
Each party can "assume" that everyone must 
have a position in the conflict. If a conflict is 
quite intense, parties can become so emotionally 
invested in their respective position that 
isolation from communication with the opposite 
party can assume paranoid degrees of distrust. 
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The mediator by bringing the parties together 
possibly is creating the setting, whereby the 
conflict is being discussed directly between the 
parties involved for the first time. 
 
The mediator must not be naïve in terms of 
appreciating the potential demands created by 
bringing the parties together. Often times, it 
can be these very demands that cause an 
inexperienced individual attempting a mediation 
to speak with each party separately. It truly is 
emotionally safer and less challenging, but 
infinitely less effective. Interviewing the parties 
separately also permits the belief to be created 
from the initial intervention that somehow the 
mediator is going to "Solve" the problem. The 
"Solution" comes from the disputants not from 
the mediator.  
 
By bringing the parties together from the onset 
of the intervention a stage can be created that 
permits the conflicting parties to begin actively 
practicing the behaviours that will ultimately 
lead to resolution, as opposed to passively 
waiting for the mediator to solve the problem. 
The mediator, by definition, cannot solve the 
problem. Unless the "Solution" is generated and 
agreed upon by both parties, whatever the 
mediator might have suggested would only be 
rejected, sabotaged, and undermined by the 
conflicting parties and not embraced as their 
own solution. It is at this point a mediator must 
continue to appreciate it is not their role to 
assume responsibility to solve the problem. It is 
the responsibility of the conflicting parties to 
solve the problem. The mediator is creating and 
structuring an environment and facilitating the 
utilization of functional communication skills that 
permit the parties to move past their 
dysfunctional communication styles and work 
towards mutual solution. The mediator cannot 
assume responsibility to solve the problem. The 
mediator cannot solve the problem, regardless of 
their skill or wisdom. Only the involved parties 
can generate a mutually agreed upon solution, 
support it, and implement it. 
 
With both parties together, the mediator must 
create a functional problem solving setting. 
Failure to control the setting can create a failed 
mediation from the outset. The mediator must 
control the setting by advising the parties from 
the outset what the "Ground Rules" are and what 
behaviour is expected during the mediation.  
 
A mediator is wise to assume the authority role 
of an unbiased party with interest in helping find 
the solution to the conflict and no interest in 
declaring one party a winner over the other 
party in the conflict. A mediator is wise to 
assume a somewhat detached, formal authority 
status-based stature in the mediation setting. It 
is not the mediator's responsibility to appear 
cordial, informal, warm or sociable. The 
somewhat emotionally distant stature by the 
mediator facilitates the development of the 
setting and maintaining the control needed to 
perform the resolution intervention.  
 
It is imperative for the mediator to advise both 
parties at the outset what the rules are:  
 
"I am going to ask each of you in turn to tell 
me your perspective on this issue. I am going 
to speak with each of you beginning with 
Party A and then I am going to speak with 
Party B. I will listen to both parties and I am 
going to insist that while the other party is 
speaking to me about their side of the issue 
that you not interrupt or challenge what the 
other party is saying"  
 
This "Ground Rule", although easy to articulate, 
is an ever-present challenge for the mediator to 
enforce during the mediation process. Each 
party will in all likelihood continue to practice 
the dysfunctional communication techniques that 
helped create the conflict. The mediator can 
expect statements by one party to be met with 
interrupted challenges to the accuracy, intent 
and factual basis of the conflicting parties 
articulation of their respective "Side of the 
story". The mediator must be prepared to 
immediately respond by regaining control of the 
situation.  
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Control can be regained by restatement of the 
ground rules or by the utilization of more subtle 
responses, such as ignoring the statement of the 
interrupting party and continuing to interview 
the appropriate party who is giving their 
respective "side".  
 
One example of a restatement of ground rules 
by the mediator can be: 
 
"I am listening to Party A right now I will 
listen to you when they have finished"  
 
The injection of structure is absolutely 
necessary to create a resolution-generating 
environment. The conflicting parties have the 
capacity to manipulate, distort, and undermine 
the mediation process if the mediator fails to 
create and maintain structured control of the 
setting. It is at this point the mediator must 
fully appreciate the defined goal of providing the 
structured situation. Many times disputing 
parties will challenge the format and attempt 
almost rebelliously to not permit a rational 
structured process to exist.  
 
Each party in a dysfunctional conflict wants to 
be the "winner" and see their opponent as the 
loser. It is the role of the mediator to create a 
win-win situation by facilitating a mutually 
agreed upon solution. 
 
Something as simple as the room arrangement 
needs to be considered. Some individuals 
attempting to create an intervention may want 
the conflicting parties "face to face" to air their 
differences. Typically this would not be an 
advisable strategy, as much as the conflicting 
parties potentially can begin arguing "at" each 
other, as opposed to, speaking "with" the 
mediator. It is advisable for the mediator to 
arrange seating that takes proximity and eye 
contact of the conflicting parties into 
consideration. The parties in the mediation 
intervention are to speak to the mediator not to 
each other.  
 
This can be the most common loss of control by a 
mediator. The parties fail to abide by the ground 
rules and the mediator lacks assertiveness or 
skill to control the situation. Having the 
mediator sit between the parties is often an 
advisable strategy; not across the table from 
each other. Obviously the setting also would 
need to be private and free from intrusions. 
 
The mediator must be ever vigilant to maintain 
the structure and integrity of the ground rules 
and operating premises. A mediator must be 
prepared for the more subtle manipulations or 
distractions to the intervention. Ploys, such as 
parties involved in a mediation asking questions 
of the mediator during the intervention can put 
the mediation under the control of the 
conflicting party by attempting to change the 
course of the process, as opposed to, under the 
control of the mediator.  
 
The mediator has no responsibility to abide by 
the expectations of normal social conversation 
and to respond to questions politely. The 
mediator can assert control and authority by 
either ignoring questions directly or if needed by 
responding "I am asking you what your thoughts 
about this are, my thoughts are not the issue we 
are dealing with". A rather direct detached 
professional restructuring early on in an 
intervention can shape and maintain the 
necessary setting for conflict resolution. 
 
One of the first goals of the mediator is to 
understand thoroughly, each disputant's beliefs 
and perceptions concerning the conflict 
situation. It is not the mediator's role to 
determine the accuracy of the beliefs. The 
mediator is not a fact-finder. The mediator is 
the developer of a problem resolving setting with 
the disputing parties generating the solution. A 
thorough understanding of each party’s beliefs 
does not signify either agreement or 
disagreement with the beliefs by the mediator.  
 
It is important for the mediator to remember in 
a great number of conflicts the difficulties lie 
not in the facts of the situation, but in the 
beliefs about the situation held and not directly 
communicated by each party to the conflict. By 
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creating a setting that has each party hearing 
the conflicting party express their individual 
beliefs about the conflict many times is an end in 
itself.  
 
The techniques of dysfunctional communication, 
such as, isolation and avoidance many times have 
the disputing parties unaware of what actually 
the other party believes. In creating a setting 
with each party "hearing out" the other party 
"uninterrupted" can at times greatly facilitate a 
resolution in itself. It may actually be the first 
time one party has heard what the other party 
believes and can rapidly lead to communicating 
where the conflicting parties "got at odds" over 
misunderstanding of simple behaviours.  
 
Dysfunctional communication techniques lead to 
projection of intent onto the other party 
without any feedback loop for reality checks or 
"checking it out directly". The results of such a 
communication style are often distrust, anger, 
projection of blame onto the other party, and 
intense isolation from any functional problem 
solving techniques. 
 
It is of paramount importance for the mediator 
to understand in detail each party's position on 
the issue. It is best that each party be 
interviewed one at a time until the complete 
story is given before moving on to the second 
party. Moving point by point between parties at 
this time does not permit the mediator to either 
maintain control or gain a full understanding of 
the central issues involved. Parties, in turn, can 
begin by "putting on the table superficial or 
superfluous" issues to test the waters and see 
what happens before they "risk" saying how they 
really feel about an issue. These tests by the 
conflicting parties can be to determine if the 
mediator is going to take sides on the issues or 
is going to be injecting what the mediator thinks 
is "fair" and imposing that on the parties. Each 
party is given a structured and facilitated 
opportunity to express completely "their side of 
the story". 
 
It is the skill of the mediator that creates the 
setting, whereby emotionally charged mistrust is 
transformed into articulated perceptions by 
each party in behavioural terms. Behavioural 
terms means describing "what" the other party 
is doing specifically, not describing how the 
party "feels" about their disputant's actions.  
 
As the mediator develops the setting for each 
party to discuss their perceptions of the issues, 
careful attention continues to be needed to 
prevent loss of structure and control. The 
mediator must assist each party in being able to 
express their thoughts, feelings, and beliefs in 
behavioural terms. This can be one of the 
biggest challenges to the mediator who is 
working with parties many times who are only 
reacting to their own emotional feelings about 
the situation and have long since abandoned any 
effort at attempting to articulate their 
thoughts clearly and as objectively as possible.  
It continues to be of paramount importance that 
the mediator focuses the conversations to them 
and not let the dialog deteriorate to eyeball-to-
eyeball exchanges of accusations between 
disputants directly.  
 
The facilitator must generate non-leading open 
ended questions that facilitate the speaking 
party in defining "what and how" is going on in 
the conflict situation from their perspective. 
The mediator is wise to steer clear of the "why" 
of events taking place. "Why" leads to projection 
of emotions, values, and judgments into the 
situation with each disputing party attempting to 
vilify their adversary and put themselves forth 
as the reasonable "victim". Using "What-How-
When-Where" as prompts forces each party to 
articulate behaviour and not respond with 
emotional tirades and accusations. 
 
It is important that the mediator not permit the 
parties to discuss events from the long-term 
past, but to keep the parties focused on the 
"here and now". Many times conflicting parties 
will attempt to "muddy the waters" by forcing 
numerous potentially irrelevant issues into the 
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mediation process. The facilitator needs to deal 
with one major issue at a time. The mediator, 
however, must not decide prematurely what the 
major issue is, but permit the parties involved to 
define the problem from their perspective. It is 
at this point many times mental health 
professionals performing mediation confuse 
mediation with psychotherapy by interjecting 
their interpretation of what is transpiring 
between the parties. Whether the 
interpretation is accurate or not, is basically 
irrelevant to mediation. All that counts is that 
each party is given the structured and 
facilitated opportunity to express completely 
their story. It is only important what the 
disputants say and hear from each other in a 
mediation because they are the parties that will 
generate the mutually agreed upon solution to 
the issue. 
 
One of the biggest challenges for the mediator 
is assisting each party with expressing 
emotionally laden thoughts into behavioural 
terms. "He just does it to make me mad" would 
need to be responded to by the mediator with 
the prompting question "What are they doing 
that you believe they are doing to make you 
mad?" The question forces the speaker away 
from their own interpretations of the opposing 
parties intentions and forces them to speak in 
terms of objective clearly defined behaviours, 
"What is the other Party doing?”  
 
People often times can not agree with "why" 
someone is doing something, but they normally 
can agree with "What" they are doing. The 
facilitator must accept each party's perceptions 
nonjudgmentally. The mediator is not a judge or 
problem solver, but rather a facilitator of a 
structured process. If a given party’s version of 
the events in question is inaccurate the mediator 
can rest assured that the disputing party will 
point out their beliefs about the inaccuracy when 
they are permitted to articulate their own 
statement of the events.  
 
By utilizing active listening skills and reflection 
techniques the mediator has each party in turn, 
clearly and in behavioural terms, complete their 
respective version of the events. This process 
has the mediator utilizing communication skills, 
such as reflection of content, summarization of 
events, and reflection of emotion. The mediator 
can put the summarization to test by reviewing 
what the respective disputants believe about the 
conflict. One example of this might be: 
 
"John, am I correct that you are angry at Joe 
because you believe he intentionally leaves 
the equipment dirty after he uses it?"  
 
The mediator should reflect back each major 
point of the disputant’s "side of the story" 
before moving onto the next party. The mediator 
can test that each party has finished expressing 
their version of the situation when they respond 
to the question "Is there anything else you would 
like to add?” in a negative mode. A "No" response 
by each party in turn lets the mediator know 
that each side in the conflict has had the 
opportunity to fully articulate their thoughts to 
the point of completion. The mediator would at 
this point reflect the summary content back to 
each party to assure individual agreement.  
 
Once each party has agreed with the mediator's 
summary of their respective problems in 
behavioural terms, the facilitation of the 
mutually agreed upon solution begins. It is 
important that the mediator not play problem 
solver and make suggestions. The mediator must 
elicit remedies point by point from the 
disputants. At this juncture the mediator begins 
moving between parties after each specific point 
of the problem is addressed. This is unlike the 
initial information-gathering phase where the 
mediator remains with one party through to 
completion of their respective statement of the 
issue.  
 
The resolution is reached point by point in 
specific terms. Generalized statements of 
agreement by each party, such as "we'll get along 
from now on", are not mutually agreed solutions 
 28            www.jibc.bc.ca Volume 4 Issue 2 
  March/April 2004 
but rather generalized "feel good" platitudes 
often times utilized as a means of avoiding the 
more behaviourally specific problem solution.  
 
The basic question the mediator utilizes at this 
phase is: 
 
"What do you suggest to remedy this issue?"  
 
If either party reverts to accusations or 
projection of emotion onto the other party the 
facilitator brings the person back to behavioural 
terms and focuses on the solution. At this point 
the problem has already been defined and the 
parties are being asked to put forth solutions to 
remedy the specific aspects of the situation. 
"What do you suggest", can be repeated after 
each negative response by either party. It 
forces the individuals into the solution phase and 
away from remaining in the dysfunctional non-
productive re-articulation of projection of blame 
onto the other party for the problem.  
 
The mediator must remain neutral and not 
project their own solutions or feelings into the 
situation. If the mutually agreed upon solution 
appears one-sided to the mediator, it is of no 
importance. It is not the mediator's perceptions 
that count, but rather the perceptions of the 
conflicting parties. If a mutually agreed upon 
solution of behavioural changes is arrived at by 
the disputing parties, the mediator has 
completed their major work.  
 
Once the "solution " has been arrived at by each 
party, the mediator would need to get each side 
to "sign off" on the specific behavioural changes 
they have agreed to perform. "Signing off" can 
be taken quite literally. Many situations benefit 
by the mediator putting in writing the specific 
agreed upon behaviours that constitute the 
solution. Having each party read their agreed 
upon behavioural changes and sign the agreement 
reinforces the idea of contractual commitment 
to the behavioural change. 
 
For some parties involved in a dysfunctional 
conflict the structured communication process 
of competent mediation is a new experience. In 
order to see that the solutions are actually being 
put into use, it is important that the mediator 
follow-up with the disputing parties after a 
reasonable period of time has passed. This is to 
determine if each party is in fact producing the 
behavioural change they agreed upon. This 
follow-up session not only determines if the 
agreed upon changes are taking place and 
reviews the accountability of each party, but 
also reinforces the concept of functional 
problem solving.  
 
The mediator must remember that problem 
solving is a skill and that many of the parties 
involved in protracted disputes or dysfunctional 
conflict lack the necessary skills for functional 
problem solving. If the mediator has been 
successful in providing the structured setting 
and process to reach resolution by the parties 
involved, an important training and skills 
development process has also taken place. Both 
parties in the conflict have learned how to 
approach the other involved individuals directly 
and to communicate, in behavioural terms, 
thoughts, expectations, and perceptions about an 
event while at the same time, respectfully 
permitting the other parties involved the same 
privilege. Workforces that communicate and 
problem solve with these traits rarely find 
themselves unable to move past a conflict 
situation. Conflict begins to signify the potential 
for growth, not the need to create angry 
fragmented groups of coworkers. 
 
Editor’s note: “In Service: 10-8” would like to 
thank Dr. Kevin Gilmartin of Gilmartin, Harris, 
and Associates for permission in reprinting this 
article. This and many other excellent articles 
are available at www.gilmartinharris.com.  
 
Note-able Quote 
  
By three methods we may learn wisdom: First, by 
reflection, which is noblest; Second, by 
imitation, which is easiest; and third by 
experience, which is the bitterest-Confucius 
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PRIVACY DEPENDS ON 
CIRCUMSTNACES 
R. v. Burley,  
(2004) Docket: C39484 (OntCA) 
 
The accused was arrested for 
impaired driving causing bodily 
harm and read his right to 
counsel after he lost control of 
his vehicle with two child passengers. He 
complained of back pain and was taken to the 
hospital by the arresting officer where he was 
provided an opportunity to speak to a legal aid 
lawyer. The accused was taken to a small 
ambulance attendant room, equipped with a desk, 
two chairs, and a telephone, where he was left 
alone to speak in private. The officer told the 
accused he would be out of earshot and stood 20 
feet away down the hallway while maintaining a 
line of sight to the doorway, but could not see or 
hear him.  
 
At his trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, the 
accused testified he was uncomfortable speaking 
to legal aid because he saw an elbow in the 
doorway that he thought belonged to a police 
officer. Because he constantly would move the 
phone from his ear to check on where the police 
officer was, he said he was deprived of adequate 
consultation. However, he never complained to 
the police. Rather, he said the police treated him 
courteously. 
 
The accused was acquitted. The trial judge 
concluded that the officer acted in a 
commendable fashion, but held the accused was 
not afforded an opportunity to speak in private, 
contrary to s.10(b) of the Charter. The Crown 
appealed, submitting that the accused’s belief 
was subjective and unreasonable and that the 
privacy afforded was more than adequate. The 
accused argued that the trial judge was correct 
and that he made no error in holding that privacy 
was infringed. 
 
In ordering a new trial, Chief Justice McMurtry, 
for the unanimous Ontario Court of Appeal, ruled 
that the totality of the circumstances—the 
individual factual context—must be considered in 
deciding whether there was an absence of 
reasonable privacy in speaking with counsel. In 
this case, the evidence was incapable of 
supporting the trial judge’s conclusion. The Court 
stated: 
 
[The accused] was informed of his right to 
counsel and he did speak to duty counsel 
while alone in a room. He had a good rapport 
with the only officer present during the 
call and was told by that officer that he 
would not be standing within earshot. The 
[accused] spoke to counsel for five to six 
minutes. At no time did he suggest to the 
officer present that he was concerned 
about his privacy. He did not ask that the 
door be closed or that he be given an 
opportunity to make a second call. [para. 
25] 
 
As a consequence, the accused’s belief he could 
not retain and instruct counsel in private was not 
reasonable. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
J.P. ENTITLED TO MAKE 
INFERENCES FROM I.T.O. 
R. v. Shiers, 2003 NSCA 138 
 
A police officer swore an 
Information to Obtain (ITO) a 
search warrant to search for 
drugs at the accused’s 
apartment. A confidential source told police that 
marihuana had been purchased from the accused 
outside his residence. He obtained the drugs 
from a large plastic bag containing about 150-
200 grams of marihuana in one gram amounts. 
The warrant was issued by a justice of the peace 
and police located 292 grams of marihuana, 
electrical scales and score sheets. He was 
charged with possession for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
 
At trial in Nova Scotia Provincial Court, the 
judge reviewed the warrant. Although there was 
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information connecting the accused to drugs and 
connecting him to the apartment, the judge 
found there was insufficient evidence to connect 
the drugs to the accused’s apartment, the target 
of the search. In her view, the source only 
described what occurred outside the address 
and there was nothing to connect the trafficking 
to the residence. The judge found the ITO was 
insufficient to justify the warrant, the search 
thus violated s.8 of the Charter, and the 
evidence was excluded under s.24(2). The 
accused was acquitted. 
 
The Crown appealed to the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal. Justice Fichaud, authoring the unanimous 
judgment, first noted that a reviewing judge is 
not to substitute their opinion on the sufficiency 
of information for that of the issuing judge. 
Rather, the test is whether there was a proper 
basis upon which the issuing judge could have 
granted the warrant. This includes drawing 
reasonable inferences from the evidence 
contained in the information to obtain.  
 
In this case, the question was whether the 
issuing judge, drawing reasonable inferences 
from the material in the ITO, could have 
concluded that there were reasonable grounds to 
believe that drugs or evidence were in the 
accused’s apartment. In holding that the trial 
judge did not consider drawing reasonable 
inferences, Justice Fichaud stated: 
 
The issuing judge, by drawing reasonable 
inferences from the quantity of drugs said to 
be in [the accused] possession at the time of 
the transaction and the way in which they 
were packaged, the evidence that [the 
accused] was known to be involved in the drug 
trade, the fact that the transaction took 
place on the street in front of his residence 
and other facts and opinions disclosed in the 
Information to Obtain, could conclude that 
there were reasonable grounds to believe 
that the items targeted by the search were 
in his residence. 
 
The reviewing judge did not consider whether 
the issuing judge could have drawn such 
reasonable inferences. 
Rather, the reviewing judge noted that there 
was nothing on the face of the Information 
"to suggest that [the accused] had been seen 
entering or leaving that residence let alone 
seen entering or leaving approximate in time 
to when Source "A" had contact with [the 
accused]." 
 
It is correct that the Information does not 
state whether or not [the accused] re-
entered his residence after the transaction. 
But the issuing judge was entitled to draw a 
reasonable inference that (1) at some point, 
[the accused] would return to his residence 
along with the remaining marihuana in the 
plastic bag; and (2) items such as scales and 
score sheets would remain at [the accused’s] 
residence even if [the accused] was 
temporarily absent. 
 
By overturning the warrant without 
considering whether there was evidence in 
the Information from which the issuing judge 
could reasonably draw the connecting 
inferences, the reviewing judge substituted 
her discretion for that of the issuing judge, 
which was an error of law. [paras. 23-27] 
 
Nova Scotia’s top court concluded that there 
was sufficient material in the ITO that the 
issuing judge could have reasonably inferred that 
there were drugs, scales, and score sheets in the 
accused’s residence. The warrant was valid and 
the search and seizure did not violate s.8 of the 
Charter. The appeal was allowed, a conviction 
substituted, and the matter was remitted to 
Provincial Court for sentencing. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical 
infants. We know more about war than we know 
about peace, more about killing than we know 
about living. We have grasped the mystery of 
the atom and rejected the Sermon on the 
Mount—Omar Bradley 
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DRIVER NOT DETAINED WHEN 
OFFICER APPROACHED PARKED 
CAR 
R. v. Calder,  
(2004) Docket: C38748 (OntCA)3 
 
A police officer followed a car 
into the parking lot of a plaza. 
He approached the vehicle on 
foot and spoke to the driver 
sitting in the vehicle, thereby 
detecting a strong odour of alcohol coming from 
his breath and noted his eyes were bloodshot. 
After admitting to consuming three beers, a 
roadside screening test was administered and 
the accused failed. He was arrested, cautioned, 
advised of his right to counsel, and given the 
breath demand. At the police station, two breath 
samples exceeding the legal limit were taken.  
 
At his trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, the 
accused was acquitted of over 80mg%. The trial 
judge dismissed the charge after concluding 
there was no legal justification for approaching 
the accused because there was no basis for 
believing he violated the Highway Traffic Act or 
any other legislation. He found the accused had 
been arbitrarily detained and, in his view, the 
officer “conscripted…the evidence of the odour 
of alcohol as he approached the vehicle”. As a 
result, the failure on the screening device was 
inadmissible for the purpose of providing 
grounds for the breath tests and the 
breathalyzer results were excluded.  
 
The Crown appealed to the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice. Justice Killeen set aside the 
acquittal and ordered a new trial. He found the 
trial judge erred: 
 
There are reasons to be found in the 
uncontradicted evidence for concluding that 
the officer's conduct toward the defendant 
at his car did not constitute a detention 
within s. 9 at all.  There is no evidence that 
                                                 
3 See R. v. Calder [2002] OJ No. 30121 (OntSCJ) for more detailed facts of the 
case. 
the officer blocked off the defendant's car 
with his cruiser in any way, nor is there any 
evidence that, when he was at the 
defendant's car, he restrained or inhibited 
the defendant in any way.  He simply asked 
the defendant a straightforward question 
about his driver's licence and, in the course 
of doing so, smelled alcohol, saw glassy eyes 
and received an admission from the accused 
that he had been drinking.  
 
At that point, the officer arguably had a 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant had 
alcohol in his system, giving the officer the 
right under s. 254 of the Code to demand a 
roadside test, as he did.  If a detention 
occurred when the demand was made it was 
justified under s. 254 and could hardly be 
called arbitrary nor could it, for that matter, 
lead to an argument that the roadside test 
somehow became an unlawful seizure within s. 
8 of the Charter.  [paras. 30-31] 
 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, but in a unanimous endorsement it was 
dismissed. The Court ruled: 
 
Like the Summary Conviction Appeal Court 
judge, we disagree with [the trial judge’s] 
analysis. The officer needed no legal 
authority to approach the [accused] while he 
was sitting in his vehicle in the public parking 
area and he needed no legal authority to 
speak to the [accused]. There is no evidence 
upon which it could be said that the [accused] 
was detained by the officer within the 
meaning of detention as explained in R. v. 
Therens (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (SCC). 
[para. 3] 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
‘DECONSTRUCTING’ GROUNDS 
FOR WARRANT IMPROPER  
R. v. Saunders, 2003 NLCA 63 
 
Three confidential police 
informants provided information 
that the accused was receiving 
hash oil and keeping it at his 
house. One source told police he had bought 
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some at the accused’s house while the two other 
sources said drugs were there. On the basis of 
this information the police obtained a Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) search 
warrant, executed it, and found drugs and 
money. The accused was charged with possession 
of a controlled substance for the purpose of 
trafficking contrary to s.5(2) of the CDSA. 
 
At his trial in the Provincial Court of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, the trial judge 
ruled the police had violated the accused’s s.8 
Charter right to be secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure. In his view, the warrant was 
improperly issued by the justice of the peace. As 
a result, the evidence was excluded and the 
accused was acquitted.  
 
The Crown successfully appealed to the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal arguing that the trial 
judge failed to examine the “totality of the 
circumstances” when assessing the sufficiency 
of the information used to support the warrant. 
Other issues raised included whether a justice 
must specifically state on the warrant that they 
are satisfied reasonable grounds exist and 
whether night-time searches are restricted 
under s.11 CDSA. 
 
Totality of the Circumstances 
 
In a 2:1 judgment, the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new 
trial. In the majority’s opinion, “the trial judge 
‘deconstructed’ every paragraph (and many 
phrases within paragraphs) in the information to 
obtain, concluding they suffered from some 
inadequacy.” As Chief Justice Wells noted: 
 
…the trial judge engaged in a critique of the 
information to obtain ... almost as if he were 
correcting a student's term paper ... and not 
an assessment of the sufficiency of the 
information in the "totality of the 
circumstances". The approach taken by the 
trial judge was like that of a person who 
views a painting square centimetre by square 
centimetre to identify defects ... which has 
its place ... but then fails to step back and 
view the painting as a whole. [para. 11] 
 
And further: 
 
If one "deconstructs" each item of 
information from source "A" and then that 
from source "B" and then that from source 
"C" and applies the test as against each item 
individually, as did the Trial Judge, then the 
answer may well be "no", as the trial judge 
concluded. But, if one considers the "totality 
of the circumstances" one sees that the 
information from the three sources is 
corroborative inter se; because of this, the 
whole of their information becomes greater 
than the sum of its parts. To put it another 
way, the sequence of pictures drawn by the 
three sources tells a consistent story: [the 
accused] sold hash oil, he kept it at his 
residence, he had hash oil at his residence on 
April 1, 2001. As such the whole could enable 
the justice of the peace to conclude that 
credibly-based probability had replaced 
suspicion. [para. 15] 
 
As a result, the majority viewed the whole 
picture as capable of supporting the authorizing 
justice’s issuance of the warrant. 
 
Warrant Defect 
 
The trial judge concluded that the justice must 
be satisfied that reasonable grounds exist and 
that such a statement must be contained in the 
warrant itself. Otherwise, there would be no way 
to determine if the issuing justice reached an 
independent conclusion. Although the justice 
must be satisfied that there are reasonable 
grounds to issue the warrant, the majority held 
that there is nothing in law requiring a justice to 
specifically state, on the face of a s.11 CDSA 
warrant, that they are satisfied reasonable 
grounds exist. As Chief Justice Wells stated, “it 
would seem more reasonable to take the justice’s 
signature on the warrant as signifying that he 
had satisfied himself as to the various 
requirements set out in section 11 of the CDSA.” 
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Night-Time Searches 
 
The trial judge found that there must be 
something in the information from which a 
justice could draw an inference that the night-
time search request had a reasonable basis. 
Again, however, the majority along with Justice 
Welsh  disagreed. Section 487 or 487.1 Criminal 
Code warrants cannot be executed at night 
unless the preconditions under s.488 are 
satisfied. On the other hand, s.11 of the CDSA 
authorizes searches at any time. Justice Wells 
stated: 
 
While he specifically acknowledged that "the 
information to obtain [a search warrant under 
section 11 of CDSA] does not have to comply 
with section 488(b) of the Criminal Code," 
the trial judge nevertheless concluded "there 
must at the very least be something in the 
information to obtain from which the justice 
can draw an inference that the request to 
search at night has a reasonable basis". With 
great respect to the trial judge, that 
conclusion produces precisely the same result 
as would flow from a determination that 
section 488(b) did apply to a search warrant 
authorized pursuant to section 11 of the 
CDSA. 
 
The trial judge failed to recognize that 
Parliament had separately imposed, by section 
488, a prohibition on the nighttime execution 
of search warrants granted under sections 
487 or 487.1 of the Criminal Code unless the 
specified preconditions were met. When 
Parliament later enacted the CDSA and 
delimited the search warrant granting 
authority in section 11, it enacted that 
certain of the provisions of the Criminal Code 
relating to the granting and execution of 
search warrants (e.g. 487.1, 489.1 and 490) 
would also apply to search warrants issued 
pursuant to section 11 of the CDSA. It did 
not direct that section 488 was to apply and 
did not, separately in section 11 of the CDSA, 
preclude execution of a search warrant by 
night unless (a) the justice is satisfied that 
there are reasonable grounds for it to be 
executed by night; (b) the reasonable grounds 
are included in the information; and (c) the 
warrant authorizes that it be executed by 
night. The courts must assume that 
Parliament was attentive to the prohibition 
against nighttime execution and the required 
preconditions for any exception set out in 
section 488 of the Criminal Code. In all of 
these circumstances the inference, again, is 
inescapable: Parliament deliberately decided 
not to apply the same prohibition and 
exception preconditions to search warrants 
granted under the authority of section 11 of 
the CDSA. 
 
The decision by the trial judge amounts to a 
determination by him that Parliament either 
ought to have so provided in section 11 or 
ought to have made section 488 of the 
Criminal Code apply to section 11 search 
warrants and he was going to apply the law as 
though it had. The trial judge has no 
jurisdiction to make such a determination and 
this Court has no jurisdiction to approve of a 
decision that so offends the separation of 
powers principle inherent in the Canadian 
Constitution. 
 
Whether a court agrees or disagrees with 
that decision of Parliament, it has no right to 
make legal determinations that fly in the face 
of it, unless it does so in the exercise of the 
mandate imposed on courts by the 
Constitution. We say this being mindful of 
the fact that the place searched, pursuant to 
the warrant in issue, was the respondent's 
dwelling. However, no constitutional challenge 
to section 11 of the CDSA was mounted, 
either before the trial judge or before this 
Court. The matter was not mentioned by 
either party or by the trial judge. There is 
therefore no basis for the trial judge 
effectively reading into section 11 of the 
CDSA the requirements he sought to impose 
in this case. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that the 
determination by the trial judge that, in the 
case of a search warrant issued pursuant to 
the authority of section 11 of the CDSA, 
"there must at the very least be something in 
the information to obtain from which the 
justice can draw an inference that the 
request to search at night has a reasonable 
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basis" is, on the law as it presently stands, in 
error. [paras. 30-34] 
 
Another View 
 
Justice Welsh disagreed with the majority that 
the trial judge erred. In his view, a careful 
paragraph by paragraph review is necessary to 
assess the reliability of various pieces of 
information to identify any deficiencies in order 
to determine whether the totality of the 
circumstances lacks a valid or substantial 
foundation. He found that there was insufficient 
information to establish the reliability of any of 
the informants, even if their information is 
consistent with each other. Further independent 
police corroboration could have buttressed the 
warrant, but was not undertaken. Justice Welsh 
found the search warrant invalid, the search of 
the accused’s residence a s.8 Charter violation, 
and would have dismissed the Crown’s appeal. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
PATROLS ON THE WILD SIDE:  
WHERE FACTS ARE OFTEN 
FUNNIER THAN FICTION 
collected by Cst. Ian Barraclough 
 
Judge Takes a Whipping 
 
In January Judge Peter 
Garcia, driving relatives 
to his courthouse in 
Covington, LA, noticed 
an odd sight directly across the street in the 
municipal cemetery. Two women in pink lingerie 
and holding S&M accessories were posing for a 
photo shoot among the gravestones. Garcia 
grabbed his camera to take his own souvenir 
photo, which apparently angered the women, who 
pursued Garcia back to his car, lecturing the 
unknown-to-her judge about various "rights" she 
thought she had not to be photographed. When 
Garcia ignored her, she began to thrash the 
judge's car with her whip before he finally drove 
away. (Edited from a Times-Picayune news story, 
January 2004.) 
 
Laws of Irony Strictly Enforced  
 
Convicted murderer Paul Charles Denyer, who 
told police back when he was arrested that he 
had picked three women to kill because he "just 
hate(s) (women)," began the application process 
at Barwon Prison in Lara, Australia, for hormone 
treatment and surgery to become a woman. 
(Edited from a News Limited (Australia) news 
story, January 2004.) 
 
Thief Fakes Heart Attack to Outwit 
Police 
 
A crafty German thief escaped 
police in Berlin after his arrest 
by faking a heart attack and 
fleeing when his handcuffs 
were removed for treatment, 
authorities in the western city 
of Duesseldorf said Wednesday. "He started 
complaining of chest pains in custody and said he 
was having a heart attack," a police spokeswoman 
said. "It seems he gave quite a convincing 
performance, and you can't be too careful in 
these situations." 
 
The 40-year-old's condition improved 
dramatically as soon as his hands were freed for 
a scan in hospital and he ran half naked to the 
nearest emergency exit. A subsequent police 
search found no trace of the man. (Edited from 
a Reuters news release, January 2004.)  
 
Chilling Crime 
 
Three men who went streaking 
through a Denny's restaurant 
were forced to chill out and 
wait for the police when they 
spotted a thief drive off in 
their getaway car with their 
clothes inside. Stranded naked outside Denny’s in 
the January weather, the three young men 
huddled together in the parking lot until police 
arrived. "I don't think they were hiding. I think 
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they were just concealing themselves," police 
spokesman Dick Cottam said. The three entered 
the restaurant before daybreak, wearing only 
shoes and hats.  
 
They left their car running so they could make a 
quick getaway…but the streakers had the tables 
turned on them in Denny’s as they stared out the 
window in disbelief. A man who just finished his 
breakfast inside the restaurant drove off in 
their car. No charges were brought against the 
streakers. "I think it was just three kids who 
decided to fool around," Cottam said. He added, 
"We always tell people to not leave their car 
running." (Edited from an Associated Press news 
report, January 2004.) 
 
Works Slows Down At An Israeli Police 
Station 
 
Israeli police had to close an 
entire floor of their station 
because the pungent scent of 
tons of confiscated marijuana 
was making them high, an 
Israeli newspaper reported. 
The drugs, smuggled from Egypt, are kept in a 
storeroom of a police station in the southern 
town of Dimona. Police have confiscated so much 
pot that their storeroom is filled to capacity. 
"Every time I came to work I felt...like I was 
high," the Maariv newspaper quoted one officer 
as saying. "The smell of marijuana was killing us - 
it was impossible to work." The newspaper said a 
police medical officer ordered personnel to move 
to another floor until all the drugs could be 
destroyed. (Edited from a Reuters news release, 
January 2004.)  
 
Knife-Wielding 90-Year-Old Kiwi Sends 
Intruder Packing 
 
A 90-year old New 
Zealand man grabbed a 
carving knife from his 
kitchen and chased away a 
masked intruder who had 
threatened his wife with a 
butter knife. The intruder waved the flimsy 
weapon at David Saulbrey's wife when she tried 
to ring the police to report a break-in at their 
home near Wellington, the Dominion-Post 
newspaper reported. 
 
Saulbrey, who failed to hear the hapless 
intruder's demand for money because he was not 
wearing his hearing aid, then beat the burglar in 
a search for a more threatening weapon. "Once I 
got the carving knife I said, “Now you bastard, 
you're in for it!”  
 
“With that he threw his knife at me and took off 
out the door," Saulbrey told the police. "I was 
that bloody wild I would have stuck (the knife) in 
his Adam's apple," he said. New Zealand police 
said they did not recommend confronting an 
armed intruder but praised Saulbrey's bravery. 
"He's a tough old bugger. You wouldn't think he 
was 90, that's for sure," Detective Scott Cooper 
was quoted as saying. (Edited from a Reuters 
news release, January 2004.)  
 
Saying 'Cheese' Incriminates Camera 
Thieves 
 
Two Chinese thieves 
captured more than they 
had bargained for when 
they took pictures of each 
other with stolen digital 
cameras, reported the China Daily newspaper in 
January. They were both arrested when trying 
to sell the cameras to passersby in eastern 
Changzhou city, arousing suspicions of the police. 
"Having stolen some cash and three digital 
cameras, they were so excited that they took 
photos of each other," the newspaper said. "But 
neither of them knew how to delete the stored 
pictures." 
 
Mustache Means Money 
 
Police in northern India are being paid an extra 
65 cents a month to grow a mustache to give 
them more authority, a newspaper reported in 
January. Mayank Jain, a superintendent with the 
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Madhya Pradesh state police, told The Asian Age 
that research showed that police with mustaches 
were taken more seriously. However, he added, 
the shape and style of police mustaches would be 
monitored to ensure they did not take on a mean 
look. (Edited from a Reuters news release, 
January 2004.) 
 
Car Thieves Call Police for Help 
 
Two Danish car thieves called 
police for help when they 
realized the angry victim of 
their latest crime was in hot 
pursuit in another car. The 
car's owner decided to chase 
the men after witnessing the theft from his 
home in northern Denmark, the local daily 
Berlingske Tidende reported. The hapless 
thieves, aged 19 and 21, called the police to 
report themselves and asked to be picked up at a 
nearby road, the newspaper said. (Edited from a 
Berlingske Tidende news story, January 2004.) 
 
Skeletons in the Closet 
 
Three fugitives scrambled 
into an attic to elude police 
but surrendered when they 
found a human skeleton in 
their hideaway, Florida 
police reported. The two men and a woman were 
wanted on probation violation charges and 
climbed into an attic to hide when police tracked 
them down in Daytona Beach, police Sgt. Al 
Tolley said. 
 
Police noticed a hatch leading to an attic above a 
second-story bedroom, and opened it. One of the 
suspects called out, "Get me out of here. 
There's a dead body up here," Tolley said. The 
three were arrested and investigators were still 
trying to identify the skeletal remains. A tenant 
told police she had lived there about three 
months and had noted a foul odor but could not 
locate the source. (Edited from a Reuters news 
release, January 2004.) 
ASD NEED NOT BE TESTED 
BEFORE DEMAND MADE 
R. v. Danychuk,  
(2004) Docket:C39898 (OntCA) 
 
A police officer stopped the 
accused driving after observing 
a vehicle weaving over the 
broken lines of a lane. An odour 
of alcohol was detected coming 
from inside the vehicle and the accused 
admitted to drinking two beers. He complied 
with a request to accompany the officer back to 
the police car and sit in the rear. A roadside 
screening device (ASD) breath sample was 
demanded, but the accused refused. The officer 
cautioned him about the consequences of 
refusing. When asked if he would provide a 
sample, the accused said, “No, I will go to court.” 
Although the officer had the screening device 
beside him, it had not been tested.  
 
At his trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the 
accused was convicted. The judge concluded that 
the officer had the ASD available forthwith, to 
be tested and then presented to the accused for 
a breath sample. However, on appeal to the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice the conviction 
was overturned and an acquittal was entered. In 
the appeal justice’s view, it had not been proven 
that the ASD was available forthwith because it 
had not been tested to ensure it was ready to 
accept a sample—the officer had not yet 
presented it, and the purpose of the test and 
the consequences of refusing had not been 
explained.  
 
The Crown successfully appealed to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal. Subsection 254(5) of the 
Criminal Code creates an offence for a person to 
fail or refuse, without reasonable excuse, to 
comply with a demand for a breath sample into 
an ASD under s.254(2). The demand requires the 
person to “provide forthwith” a breath sample. 
This imposes a duty on the police to administer 
the test “as soon as reasonably practicable or 
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within a reasonable time having regard to the 
provision and circumstances of the case.” As 
Justice Blair, authoring the 3:0 judgment, noted: 
 
The rationale for this requirement is that 
unless the police officer is in a position to 
require a breath sample to be provided 
before there is any realistic opportunity for 
the detained person to consult counsel, that 
person’s s.10(b) Charter right to counsel may 
be unjustifiably infringed, and therefore a 
demand cannot be validly within the scope of 
subsection 254(2). [para. 15]  
 
Justice Blair disagreed with the accused’s 
submission that a valid demand requires proof 
the police were immediately ready to administer 
the test or that they advised the motorist of 
the process and consequences of not complying 
with the demand. Justice Blair stated: 
 
As I read the language of subsection 254(2) 
and appreciate its context, however, I see 
nothing in it mandating - either expressly or 
by implication - that before a demand may be 
made the approved screening device must be 
warmed up and tested as operational and the 
police officer must have explained the 
process and the consequences of a failure to 
comply. Respectfully, it is an unwarranted 
extension of the foregoing authorities to 
read such requirements into the section 
where the accused had categorically refused 
to provide the requested breath sample, and 
the summary conviction appeal judge erred in 
law in doing so. 
 
[The accused] refused, unequivocally, to 
provide a breath sample. This court has held, 
in such circumstances, that the Crown need 
not even demonstrate the device in question 
was an approved screening device as a 
prerequisite to a valid demand…In addition, 
this court and others have held that in such 
circumstances the Crown does not have to 
show an approved screening device was in the 
possession of, or immediately available to, the 
police officer at the time of the demand… 
In my opinion, while it may be sensible for a 
police officer to make sure the device is 
working and the motorist apprised of the 
process and the consequences of non-
compliance, it cannot be said - in the face of 
these authorities - that these matters 
constitute prerequisites to a valid demand for 
a breath sample under subsection 254(2), in 
my opinion…[paras. 19-21, references 
omitted] 
 
And further: 
 
A demand will not be a valid demand under 
subsection 254(2) if the police are not in a 
position to administer the test "forthwith", i.e. 
in a timely fashion before there is any realistic 
opportunity to consult counsel…However, these 
cases do not stand for the proposition that 
the police must be in a position to "make the 
demand good" the instant the request is made. 
In fact, the opposite is true. [para. 23, 
references omitted] 
 
In summary, Justice Blair held: 
 
A timely demand is validly made pursuant to 
subsection 254(2), in my opinion, where (a) 
the individual to whom the demand is made 
has been operating a motor vehicle, or has 
care or control of that vehicle, (b) the peace 
officer who makes the demand reasonably 
suspects that the individual to whom the 
demand is being made has alcohol in his or her 
body, and (c) the police officer is ultimately 
in a position to require that the breath 
sample be provided before there is any 
realistic opportunity to consult counsel. 
Where, as here, there has been an outright 
refusal to provide a breath sample, it is not a 
prerequisite to such a demand that the Crown 
establish the approved screening device was 
present at the scene, tested and ready to 
accept a sample, or that the police officer 
presented the device to the driver and 
explained the purpose of the test and the 
consequences of a failure to provide a sample. 
[para. 26] 
 
The appeal was allowed and the conviction was 
restored. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
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ANTICIPATORY WARRANT: 
LAST, NOT FIRST RESORT 
PROVISION 
R. v. Brooks,  
(2003) Docket: C35693 (OntCA) 
 
As a result of confidential 
information and surveillance, 
the police had reason to believe 
the accused was involved in a 
dial a dope cocaine trafficking scheme. She 
would contact customers by cell phone and 
arrange a meet to deliver the cocaine. She only 
kept a small quantity with her, and would return 
to her residence to get more drugs when her 
supply ran low.  The police received information 
that the accused was going to be very active the 
next day. They obtained a general warrant under 
s.487.01 of the Criminal Code from the Ontario 
Court of Justice allowing them to enter and 
search the accused’s residence for cocaine and 
other evidence, provided certain pre-conditions 
were met after conducting surveillance. Before 
executing the warrant on her home, the following 
would need to be satisfied: 
 
• three hours before entry, the police must 
observe the accused as a driver or passenger in 
a motor vehicle and on reasonable grounds 
believe she was delivering drugs; and 
• upon her arrest and search, the police needed 
to find cocaine in or ejected from the vehicle. 
 
The pre-conditions were satisfied and the police 
searched the accused’s residence. Marihuana, a 
loaded handgun, crack cocaine, and other 
evidence were found. At her trial in the Ontario 
Court of Justice, the evidence was admitted and 
the accused was convicted of cocaine possession 
for trafficking, marihuana possession, and 
weapon possession. The trial judge concluded 
that the pre-conditions were not only 
unauthorized by the warrant provision, but also 
unnecessary to the validity of the warrant. In 
his view, the warrant was valid without the 
unauthorized pre-conditions and the evidence 
obtained was admissible.  
 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that the 
police had other provisions in the Criminal Code 
or Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
available to them to obtain a search warrant. 
Therefore the statutory requirement of 
s.487.01(1)(c) was not satisfied. Justice 
Moldaver, writing the unanimous appeal judgment 
agreed.  
 
Section 487.01, also known as an anticipatory 
search warrant, allows the police to execute a 
warrant provided certain pre-conditions are met. 
However, s.487.01(1)(c) only allows a general 
warrant to be issued if “there is no other 
provision [in the Criminal Code] or any other Act 
of Parliament that would provide for a warrant, 
authorization or order permitting the technique, 
procedure or device to be used or the thing to 
be done.” It is a last resort, rather than a first 
resort provision. 
 
In this case, “leaving aside mere possibilities, 
the police had no reason to believe that the 
[accused’s] arrest would trigger the destruction 
of drugs or other evidence at her residence 
before the police could obtain a conventional 
warrant to search it.” In other words, the police 
could have arrested the accused and then 
applied for a traditional search warrant to enter 
and search her residence. Since the police did 
not comply with the statutory pre-condition of 
s.487(1)(c), the warrant was invalid. As a result, 
the accused’s s.8 Charter right protecting her 
against unreasonable search or seizure was 
violated.  
 
Despite the breach however, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal admitted the evidence under s.24(2). 
The police acted in good faith, had reasonable 
grounds to search the residence, and the 
exclusion of the evidence, not its inclusion, would 
bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. The accused’s appeal was dismissed 
and her conviction upheld. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
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OWNERSHIP CLAIM DOES NOT 
ALTER SEARCH INCIDENT TO 
ARREST  
R. v. Mohamad,  
(2004) Docket: C36120 (OntCA) 
 
After receiving information 
from Custom’s officials 
investigating the exportation of 
a stolen vehicle to Amsterdam, 
a police detective attended a 
used car business where a Yukon truck was 
reportedly parked that had the same vehicle 
identification number (VIN) as the VIN declared 
on the vehicle subject for exportation. The 
officer blocked in the Yukon truck being driven 
on the lot and spoke to the driver. The officer 
noticed that the Yukon’s VIN was glued to the 
dashboard, rather than riveted in accordance 
with manufacturer standards. This was also the 
case for a van parked beside the truck, causing 
the officer to conclude the original VINs had 
been removed and false VINs attached.   
 
The driver said the truck belonged to the owner 
of the used car business, Mr. Jebo. Jebo was 
arrested for possession of stolen property and a 
tow truck was called to attend the scene to 
remove the truck and van for forensic 
examination. The van was unlocked and the keys 
were in the ignition. The officer entered the van, 
took a look around, and saw a briefcase. He 
looked inside the briefcase and saw documents 
with the accused Mohamad’s name. As the tow 
truck arrived, the accused approached the 
officer telling him the briefcase was his and 
that he had forgotten it in the van after test 
driving it an hour earlier. When asked about the 
van, the accused said he was going to but it. A 
further search of the briefcase revealed the 
presence of a dealer’s licence plate, air tickets 
to Amsterdam, and shipping documents for the 
van to Amsterdam. 
 
The officer left to give instructions to the tow 
truck operator, but on return discovered the 
accused had removed the briefcase from the van 
and entered a neighbouring building. The officer 
located the accused and told him to take the 
briefcase back to the van so he could thoroughly 
search it before giving it to him. He returned 
the briefcase to the van and its contents were 
searched. In it, police found sealed envelopes 
containing counterfeit VIN plates, stickers, 
parts, and certification labels. The accused 
denied knowledge of these items or how they 
came to be in his briefcase. Other documentary 
evidence was also found in the briefcase 
including the accused’s passport and driver’s 
licence. He was arrested and charged with 
possession of the stolen truck and van as well as 
a third vehicle later found at the used car 
business.  
 
At his trial in the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice, the accused argued that the police had 
no authority to open and search the briefcase 
once it was learned he owned it. In his 
submission, he had not been arrested, was not a 
suspect in any crime, and no basis existed to 
issue a search warrant until after the briefcase 
was opened. Thus, he contended his rights under 
s.8 of the Charter had been breached and the 
evidence was inadmissible. The Crown, on the 
other hand, asserted that the police were 
permitted to search the van and its contents to 
discover and preserve evidence as an incident to 
the arrest of Jebo, the business owner.  
 
The trial judge agreed with the Crown and found 
no Charter violation. In his view, the officer had 
seized the stolen van and had the authority, as 
an incident to Jebo’s arrest, to inspect it and its 
contents. The fact the accused had appeared on 
the scene and claimed ownership of the 
briefcase did not alter the officer’s authority to 
search. The accused appealed to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal arguing, among other grounds, 
that the trial judge erred in admitting the 
evidence from the briefcase search.  
 
Section 8 of the Charter protects a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy against 
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unreasonable governmental intrusion. Thus, for a 
person to argue that their s.8 right has been 
violated, they must first demonstrate that they 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy. If this 
burden is met, the next consideration is whether 
police conducted the search reasonably. 
Whether a person has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy depends on the totality of the 
circumstances—it’s a contextual approach. Here, 
the accused did not contend he had privacy in 
the stolen vehicle, but rather only in the 
contents of the briefcase. In holding that the 
owner of a briefcase has a privacy interest in its 
contents, Justice Cronk stated: 
 
In the contemporary context, briefcases 
often house highly confidential personal and 
business information. They can serve, in a 
practical sense, as portable offices for their 
owners. In my view, owners of briefcases 
generally have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the contents of their briefcases. 
[para. 25] 
 
However, even where a person can establish a 
privacy interest in the thing searched, the 
search will not infringe s.8 if the police have the 
lawful authority in the circumstances to search 
it. One such authority, search incident to arrest, 
was described by Justice Cronk as follows: 
 
Search incident to arrest does not require a 
warrant or independent reasonable and 
probable grounds for the search. In those 
respects, it is an exception to the ordinary 
requirements for a reasonable search. 
Rather, the right to search derives from the 
fact of the arrest, which itself requires 
reasonable and probable grounds or an arrest 
warrant. If the arrest is unlawful, the search 
is also unlawful…[para. 28, references 
omitted] 
 
In this case, the accused did not contest the 
lawfulness of Jebo’s arrest, the manner of the 
search, or its warrantless nature. Rather, he 
suggested that once the accused claimed 
ownership, continuing to search the briefcase 
contents exceeded the incidental search scope 
because there were no grounds to believe the 
accused committed a crime or that the briefcase 
contained evidence.  
 
The law is clear that a search incidental to 
arrest requires a legitimate purpose connected 
to the arrest. As Justice Cronk noted, “The 
legitimate purposes of search incident to arrest 
extend to the protection of evidence from 
destruction at the hands of the arrestee or 
others and to the discovery of evidence that can 
be used at the arrestee's trial.” The officer 
testified he was looking in the briefcase to 
locate evidence concerning the theft of the van 
and the “re-VINing” scheme. He said he had 
seized the van and the trial judge found he had a 
duty to inspect it and its contents to discover 
and preserve any evidence. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal agreed. Justice Cronk held: 
 
[The officer] had one of the purposes of a 
valid search incident to arrest in mind when 
he conducted his search of the briefcase, 
that is, the discovery of evidence concerning 
the charges against Jebo. It was open to the 
trial judge to accept [the officer’s] assertion 
of a bona fide subjective belief that he was 
authorized to search the briefcase for that 
law enforcement purpose. There is no 
suggestion that [the officer’s] belief changed 
at any point throughout the occasions when 
he searched the contents of the briefcase. 
 
In my view, [the officer’s] subjective belief 
that searching the contents of the briefcase 
might lead to the discovery of evidence 
concerning the charges against Jebo was a 
reasonable one in all of the circumstances. 
The Plymouth van, which contained the 
briefcase, was directly implicated in the 
charges against Jebo. The van and the 
briefcase were located on the premises 
where Jebo was arrested and [the officer] 
searched the contents of the briefcase a 
short time after Jebo's arrest. The search 
of the briefcase, therefore, was closely 
connected to the arrest of Jebo. 
 
Viewed in that context, I agree with the trial 
judge that the [accused’s] attendance at the 
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van and his claim to ownership of the 
briefcase did not "alter the scope of [the 
officer’s] authority" to search the briefcase. 
Although [the officer] knew the [accused] 
from "the past", the record before us does 
not indicate how he came to know the 
[accused] or how well he knew him. There is 
no suggestion that his prior knowledge of the 
[accused] was sufficient to persuade him that 
the [accused’s] assertion of ownership of the 
briefcase was true or that, in light of it, the 
[accused] was an innocent and uninvolved 
third party. 
 
[The officer] was not obliged to simply 
accept the [accused’s] assertions of 
ownership of the briefcase and of an innocent 
explanation for its presence in the stolen van, 
and to terminate the search of the briefcase 
on the basis of those assertions. That 
proposition, urged by the [accused], defies 
common sense and, if accepted, would render 
the search incident to arrest power 
meaningless in circumstances where, but for 
the ownership claim, it is being lawfully 
exercised for the purpose of discovering or 
preserving evidence relating to a crime. 
[paras. 37-40] 
 
And further: 
 
Here, on each occasion that [the officer] 
opened the briefcase, he undertook his 
search of its contents for the purpose of 
discovering evidence relating to the crimes 
for which Jebo had been arrested. The 
searches were grounded in Jebo's arrest and 
were carried out in a vehicle known to have 
been stolen. 
 
In these circumstances, I conclude that the 
requirements for a valid search of the 
[accused’s] briefcase under the search 
incident to arrest power were met. The 
search of the contents of the briefcase was 
not unlawful or unreasonable and, hence, the 
evidence obtained from that search was 
admissible. [paras. 47-48] 
 
The accused’s appeal against conviction was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
STATUTORILY COMPELLED 
STATEMENT VIOLATES 
CHARTER s.7 
R. v. Zwicker, 2003 NSCA 140 
 
A motor vehicle, owned by the 
accused, was involved in an 
accident, but the driver failed 
to remain at the scene as 
required by law. The accused 
was served a notice under s.258(1) of Nova 
Scotia’s Motor Vehicle Act (Act) requiring a 
registered owner, at the request of a peace 
officer, to supply the name and address of the 
person in charge of the vehicle at the time of a 
violation of the Act. Failure to furnish such 
information is a summary offence. The accused 
admitted she was the driver at the time of the 
accident and she was charged with failing to stop 
at the scene and failing to yield the right of way 
under the Act.  
 
At her trial in Nova Scotia Provincial Court, the 
judge concluded that the admission of the 
statutorily compelled statement provided 
pursuant to the Act violated the accused’s rights 
under s.7 of the Charter—the principle against 
self incrimination—and was inadmissible under 
s.24. The accused was acquitted. The Crown 
appealed to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
arguing that the trial judge erred in both finding 
a s.7 breach as well as excluding the statement 
as evidence.  
 
Justice Hamilton, writing the unanimous 
judgment, upheld the trial judge’s ruling. Section 
7 of the Charter states: 
 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
the person and the right not to be deprived thereof 
except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice. 
 
Because the accused could be imprisoned, 
although remote, if she were found guilty of the 
“quasi criminal” charges under the Act, it was 
nonetheless a real possibility and thus had the 
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potential of depriving her of her liberty. 
Therefore, s.7 of the Charter was engaged. The 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal also agreed with 
the trial judge’s assessment that the admission 
of the statutorily compelled statement would 
offend the principles of fundamental justice. 
The four main factors to consider in such a 
determination are: 
 
• whether there was coercion; 
• whether there was an adversarial 
relationship; 
• whether the statement would likely be 
unreliable; and 
• whether there was potential for abuse of 
power in the obtaining of the statement. 
 
In this case, the trial judge concluded the 
coercion factor was neutral. The Crown had 
unsuccessfully argued that because people 
choose to drive or not, those that do drive 
freely consent to the application of s.258 of the 
Act. However, an adversarial relationship 
existed. The accused was personally served the 
notice by a police officer and they received a 
response the next day. As well, there is a strong 
incentive for someone to lie if the statement is 
not protected from being used against the 
person—thus the prospect of an unreliable 
statement is very real. Finally, abuse of power 
was a factor properly considered by the trial 
judge. As Justice Hamilton stated: 
 
Once a person is compelled by s. 258 of our 
Act to tell the police what may often be one 
of the essential elements of an offence, they 
may be more apt to believe they should 
provide more detail. Personal delivery of the 
notice under s. 258 of our Act gave the police 
a foot in the door so to speak that may lead, 
intentionally or unintentionally, to the police 
seeking more information and depriving the 
owner of the principle against self-
incrimination. [para. 37] 
 
The statement was properly ruled inadmissible 
and the appeal was dismissed. 
 
 
 
 FINDING FUN IN 
FITNESS 
Sgt. Kelly Keith, JIBC  
 
Running  
 
If you want to increase your endurance try 
PLYOMETRIC strides, also known as bounding. 
This is an exaggerated running stride that places 
stress on the running muscles through a range of 
motion that is greater than normal.  Find a 
smooth, gradual hill that is not too steep—grass 
is best. Run up the hill—springing—off your toes 
with each stride and land on the ball of your 
other foot.  Just after your foot touches the 
ground, let your heel touch the ground and 
simultaneously allow your knee to bend more than 
normal.  This pre-stretches your muscles in 
preparation for the next leg extension and toe-
off. 
  
Bound up the hill for 30-50 yards, jog down, and 
repeat three or four times.  Do this once per 
week adding one or two reps per week until you 
can do 10 reps with good form, then lengthen the 
distance to 100 yards.  You will not only improve 
your running, you will also decrease your injuries 
and increase your strength.    Make sure to 
stretch your quads and calves after your 
workout! You may be self conscious about how 
this looks, however the benefits will come fast 
and will far outweigh the downside !    
  
Workout 
 
Try working out on a mirror image basis of your 
muscles.  The workout is done on a super-set 
model.  The pairings are as follows: 
  
• Chest/Back/Shoulders - Day 1 
• Biceps/Triceps/Abs/Lower Back - Day 2 
• Quads/Hamstrings/Calves - Day 3 
  
On Day 1 your first set is bench presses 
followed immediately by rows to complete your 
first set and so on and so on.  Don’t get caught 
up in which specific exercises you do. However, 
by doing your workout with these pairings and 
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super setting each set (change order every 
other workout such as rows then bench press on 
following work-out) it will give you a change of 
pace. 
  
Tips to Increase Bench Press  
  
• Plant your feet firmly on the floor and drive 
them hard into the floor; 
• Use a thumb lock grip (wrap thumbs around 
the bar); 
• Vary your bench press grip width from 
workout to workout. However, the optimal 
grip is one that results in a 90 degree angle 
at your armpit and 90 degree at your elbow 
when the bar touches your chest at the 
bottom; 
• Don't press the bar in a curved motion—go 
straight up; 
• Incorporate deep dumbbell work; and 
• Pull your shoulder blades together and 
contract your lats. 
  
Nutrition 
  
Meat cuts with "loin" in them tend to have less 
fat such as pork tenderloin. If you buy ground 
turkey—ensure it is ground turkey "breast". 
Remember—“FAT FREE" does not mean healthy.  
Take a look at how much sugar is in fat free 
yogurt then compare this with natural 
unflavoured yogurt that you can add fruit to and 
you will have a low fat healthier snack ! 
  
Food For Thought  
 
While reviewing the recruits’ fitness reports, I 
constantly see them working on their strengths 
rather than their weaknesses.  For example, a 
thin recruit that can run is spending three times 
the time and energy on aerobic exercise, rather 
than strength exercises.  Spending time on our 
strengths can often be more fun, however, by 
spending time on our weaknesses we will become 
better rounded.  How do you spend your fitness 
related time - on your strengths or weaknesses?  
 
Note-able Quote 
 
If there’s no wind, row—Unknown  
CRIMINAL HARASSMENT: 
CONTENT MATTERS 
R. v. Scuby, 2004 BCCA 28 
 
The accused left nine telephone 
messages for a police detective 
who was a member of the 
Domestic Violence Unit. The 
detective had been investigating the accused as 
a suspect in a break and enter that occurred at 
his former girlfriend’s mother’s home. Five 
messages, all in short succession, were left on 
the mother’s answering machine and the other 
four, again in rapid succession, were left on the 
detective’s workplace voice mail. The messages 
were threatening in tone against the detective 
and his family. The accused was charged with 
criminal harassment for the repeated 
communication. However, in British Columbia 
Provincial Court he was acquitted. The trial judge 
concluded that the content of the messages, 
rather than their repeated nature, led to the 
detective’s fear. In the judge’s view, the 
harassment envisioned by s.264 must be 
grounded in the “repeated communication”, not 
the words used.   
 
An appeal by the Crown was successful. In 
setting aside the acquittal and ordering a new 
trial, Justice Prowse of the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in 
separating the quantity of the calls from their 
content in determining whether the detective 
was harassed. A court must consider the 
content, context, and repetitious nature of the 
calls, rather than the number of calls by itself. 
Justice Rowles, in an accompanying opinion, 
added, “[t]he ‘communicating’ found in 
s.264(2)(b) comes from the verb to 
communicate, or to share or exchange 
information or ideas. The act of communication 
means the transmission of information, thought 
or feeling so that it is received and understood. 
While it may not be so in every case, generally an 
examination and consideration of the content of 
the message would be essential to the 
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determination of whether a complainant was 
‘harassed’ by the repeated communication.” In 
other words, the content, not just the number of 
calls, is relevant in assessing whether a person is 
harassed.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
OFFICERS DOWN 
Sgt. Dave Schmirler, Abbotsford Police 
 
At around 2am on Monday 
February 16, 2004 officers 
Matthew Bowens (21 years) 
and his partner Jennifer 
Fettig (26 years) initiated a 
traffic stop on a rusted 1989 
Chev pickup owned and driven 
by Eric Lee Marshall (22 
years).  Marshall had apparently tried to pick up 
a local prostitute.  Although taught a technique 
in the academy where one officer remains at the 
car watching the occupant(s), both officers 
returned to their patrol car to initiate computer 
queries.  Neither must have sensed any danger 
as they did not notify dispatch of the stop.  The 
press would later call it a “routine traffic stop”. 
 
Had the computer check been completed the 
officers would have learned that Marshall had no 
criminal record.  However, they would not have 
known that he had recently decided to set up a 
drug operation and was in possession of a street 
purchased .40 caliber Glock.  As both officers 
sat in their car Marshall exited his truck and 
went to the rear.  From here he began firing into 
the patrol car, blowing out the window and 
wounding Bowens.  Marshall fled to a nearby 
fence line.  Bowens exited his car, called for 
assistance, and moved to cover at the rear of his 
patrol car.  This was the last broadcast that he 
would make.  From a distance Marshall continued 
to fire at the officers hitting Fettig in the face 
as she sat in the passenger side of the car.  
Bowens would be shot nine times, including a shot 
to the head.  Marshall took Bowen’s gun and fled 
the scene. 
Matt Bowens would die at the scene and 
Jennifer Fettig would die hours later.  
Investigators found 22 x .40 calibre shell 
casings.  Published reports indicate neither 
officer returned fire.  The shooting was partially 
captured by the in-car camera. 
 
With the deaths of officers Fettig and Bowens, 
a disturbing trend of officers being killed 
together continued.  Since January 2003, 14 
officers (seven pairs) have been killed in North 
America. 
 
February 2003—Alexandria, LA 
 
PFC David Ezernack and patrolman Jeremy 
Carruth were shot and killed during an SRT 
operation to arrest a man who had ambushed an 
officer the previous day, firing an automatic 
rifle into the car.  The suspect opened fire on 
SRT members effecting the arrest. 
 
March 2003—New York, NY 
 
Detective James Nemorin and Detective Rodney 
Andrews were involved in the undercover 
purchase of a Tec–9 gun when they were each 
shot in the head as they sat in their vehicle.  
Surveillance units, who had been forced to leave 
their view of the officers, heard the exchange 
on the audio hook up. 
 
June 2003—Fayette, AL 
 
Corporal James Crump and Officer Arnold 
Strickland (along with a police dispatcher) were 
killed in the booking area of the Fayette Police 
Department when a vehicle theft suspect 
grabbed one of the officers’ service guns. 
 
December 2003—Abbeville, SC 
 
Sergeant Daniel Wilson was taken hostage and 
shot while attending to a property dispute.  The 
suspects called police to report that an officer 
had been shot—then opened fire on two other 
officers responding to the call.  Constable 
Donnie Ouzts was struck and killed.  The attack 
was pre-planned. 
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December 2003—Mishawaka, IN 
 
Corporal Thomas Roberts and Patrolman Bryan 
Verkler were shot and killed after they 
attempted to lure a “shots fired” suspect out of 
a house.  The suspect exited and opened fire on 
officers, killing both. 
 
January 2004—Athens, AL 
 
Officer Anthony Mims and Sergeant Larry 
Russell were ambushed and killed while 
responding to a call of a man wanting to speak 
with the FBI.  Mims was shot and killed in his car 
as he arrived and Russell was shot and killed as 
he attempted to get out of his car. 
 
For those of us in Canada, do we write this trend 
off as a “United States” problem?  Do we 
remember Constable Denis Strongquill? He and 
his partner approached three occupants in a 
truck because they matched the description of 
armed robbery suspects. The suspects shot at 
the police car, chased it into the town of Russell, 
and rammed it in front of the detachment 
office. Constable Strongquill was killed because 
he was trapped in his police vehicle after 
suspects rammed it. He never had a chance to 
exit and was unable to return fire due to a pistol 
malfunction. 
 
For police officers and trainers, this disturbing 
trend forces us to analyze what is happening.  
Are we still thinking tactically at every call?  Do 
we abandon safety procedures in favour of 
efficiency and convenience?  Is there a better 
way to do things? More importantly, are we 
prepared to defend against a determined 
adversary waiting in ambush or that is willing to 
initiate an armed or relentless assault?   Do we 
really train to expect the unexpected?  Do we in 
fact expect the unexpected on every call?  As 
determined suspects, sometimes with military 
training or mental illness, ambush and attack 
officers with incredible lethal force we have to 
elevate our thinking.  Do we think we have safety 
in numbers at the expense of tactics? 
 
I don’t know the answers.  I can only try and 
change my mindset and help those I am 
responsible for.  I only hope that the deaths of 
others would cause us to think and reflect. 
 
STRAIGHT SHOOTIN’ FROM 
THE BENCH 
 
“Surely, the officer was not supposed to read 
the appellant his [s.10 Charter] rights while he 
was asleep.”—Madame Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in 
R. v. Feeney (1997), 115 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.) 
 
********* 
“It would be impractical to expect of an officer 
swearing an information [for a search warrant] in 
these circumstances the precise prose of an 
Oxford grammarian, the detailed disclosures of 
a confessional and the legal knowledge of a 
Rhodes scholar.”—Justice Gibbs in R. v. 
Melenchuk (1993), 24 B.C.A.C. 97 (B.C.C.A.) 
********* 
“No one but lawyers and judges would have any 
difficulty deciding that the appellant, whom I 
shall call ``the accused'', imported nearly a 
pound of heroin into Canada when he arrived at 
the Vancouver International Airport… This would 
especially be so when, upon being informed by a 
customs officer that he would be X-rayed, the 
accused admitted, as was later confirmed, that 
he had that quantity of packaged heroin in his 
stomach and intestines.”—Chief Justice 
McEachern in R v. Oluwa (1996), 107 C.C.C. (3d) 
236 (B.C.C.A.) 
********* 
“[Proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the 
presumption of innocence] are forever as closely 
linked as Romeo with Juliet or Oberon with 
Titania and they must be presented together as 
a unit. If the presumption of innocence is the 
golden thread of criminal justice then proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is the silver and 
these two threads are forever intertwined in the 
fabric of criminal law.”—Justice Cory in R v. 
Lifchus, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320 (S.C.C.) 
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POLICE PERMITTED TO 
PROTECT CRIME SCENE 
R. v. Edwards & Edwards, 2004 ABPC 14 
 
The police were investigating a 
homicide near a nightclub and 
cordoned off the area using 
yellow tape. Several vehicles 
were parked within the 
restricted area and officers were posted to 
keep persons out of the crime scene until 
identification officers had cleared. The two 
Edwards brothers sought to have access to their 
vehicle, which was parked within the taped off 
area, but were denied. They insisted they had 
the right to enter, argued with police, and yelled 
obscenities. A crowd began to gather and the 
two brothers were subsequently arrested for 
causing a disturbance. 
 
At their trial in Alberta Provincial Court, Justice 
Allen examined whether it was within the scope 
of police duties to prohibit public access to 
property within the boundaries of the crime 
scene.   The Justice concluded that restricting 
persons from accessing their property on city 
streets amounted to an interference with their 
personal liberty, but was justified under the 
police common law duty to investigate crime.  
 
In this case, the accused’s vehicle was legally 
parked and had the misfortune of becoming part 
of a temporary crime scene. However, 
“[p]reventing the accused from intruding upon an 
area that may have contained incriminating 
evidence was a justifiable use of police powers 
associated with investigating the 
murder…Investigating crime is crucial to 
apprehending suspects, and prosecuting 
offenders. The temporary inconvenience to the 
accused was necessary to properly secure 
evidence from the scene,” ruled the justice. Both 
accused were convicted.  
 
Complete copy available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
SAFETY SEARCH OF DETAINEE 
REASONABLE 
R. v. Davis, 2004 ABCA 33 
 
The police responded to a call 
that the accused was engaged in 
several drug transactions. The 
attending officers saw the 
accused, who matched the 
description of the suspect. He was detained for 
investigation, handcuffed, and frisk searched. A 
bulge was detected around his shin, which turned 
out to be a cardboard Pringles chip container. 
Police opened the container to look for weapons 
and found it to contain crack cocaine. The 
accused was arrested, charged, and convicted in 
the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench with 
possession of cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking. However, he appealed to Alberta’s 
highest court, arguing the detention and search 
were unlawful.  
 
In a 3:0 judgment, the Alberta Court of Appeal 
unanimously dismissed the appeal. The police had 
articulable cause to detain the accused to 
investigate whether he had just committed a 
series of drug deals. Since he was properly 
detained, the police were entitled to search him 
for safety reasons provided it was done in good 
faith. The appeal court rejected the accused’s 
assertion that the only way the chip container 
could be searched is if the officer expected to 
find a weapon inside. The trial judge found it 
reasonable and prudent for the officer to open 
the container and determine its contents for 
safety reasons. Given the size and utility of the 
canister as a hiding place for a weapon, the trial 
court’s ruling was not in error said Justice 
Berger. In all the circumstances the search was 
reasonable. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
An ounce of action is worth a ton of theory—
Friedrich Engels 
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SUBTLE, BUT SIGNIFICANT 
NUANCE RESULTS IN BREACH 
R. v. Webster, 2004 BCPC 19 
 
The accused was read the 
breath demand and advised of 
his right to counsel from the 
standard police issue card after 
being stopped driving by police. 
The accused said he understood and told the 
officer he wanted to speak to a lawyer. The 
following conversation followed: 
 
Officer:  Do you want a lawyer? 
Accused: Not at this point. 
Officer:  Will you want to? 
Accused: Probably. I don’t know. 
Officer: Do you want counsel, either one you 
know or Legal Aid? 
Accused: I’m from out of town. I don’t know any 
in town. 
Officer: There are several local lawyers, if you 
want to choose one, or there’s Legal 
Aid that can be contacted. Is Legal Aid 
okay for you? 
Accused: Legal Aid will be fine. 
 
He was taken to the police station and spoke 
with duty counsel in private for about six 
minutes. Two breath samples were taken and a 
number of questions were asked in between the 
samples—he was charged with impaired driving 
and over 80mg%. In British Columbia Provincial 
Court, Justice Blake found the accused’s right to 
counsel under s.10(b) of the Charter had been 
violated. In the judge’s view, the accused 
erroneously believed his choice of counsel was 
limited to local lawyers, a fact the officer should 
have known when the accused said he did not 
know any in the area. The officer had a duty to 
correct this faulty assumption as part of the 
proper informational component of s.10(b). 
Nevertheless, the evidence was admitted 
because its admission would not bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. 
 
Complete case available at www.provinicalcourt.bc.ca 
MANITOBA’s TOP COURT 
UPHOLDS WARRANTLESS 
ENTRY & ARREST 
R. v. Guiboche, 2004 MBCA 16 
 
The police responded to a home 
where the body of a murdered 
woman had been found—she was 
brutally beaten to death. Her 
live-in boyfriend, the accused, was the suspect, 
but had fled the scene before police arrived. 
The police guessed he may have gone to his 
father’s home, so several members attended to 
this house about three hours after finding the 
body. A police officer “snuck up” through the 
yard, entered an open porch, and knocked on the 
back door, which was answered and opened by 
the father. The officer stepped over the 
threshold of the door and said they were looking 
for the accused. The father told police he was 
upstairs and suggested they be quiet. After 
further discussion, the police went upstairs and 
found the accused asleep. He was arrested and 
articles of clothing were seized as evidence. 
Fingerprints, hand swabs, breathalyzer samples, 
and photographs were also taken following his 
arrest.  
 
At trial in the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench, 
the judge found the police had exigent 
circumstances, as defined under s.529.3 of the 
Criminal Code, to enter the dwelling-house 
without a warrant and effect the arrest. The 
officer testified he was concerned about officer 
safety and the preservation of evidence—such as 
blood, tissue, and fluids—from the extremely 
violent murder scene. The judge was not critical 
of the police for stealthing to the back door, 
stating they were not expected to announce 
their presence by a “march through the yard 
with a brass band.” The evidence was admitted 
and the accused was convicted by a jury. The 
accused appealed his conviction to the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal arguing, among other grounds, 
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that the trial judge erred in finding the evidence 
properly admissible.  
 
Justice Freedman, authoring the unanimous 
judgment, held that the trial judge erred in 
finding s.529.3 applicable in this case. As a pre-
condition to allowing warrantless entries into 
dwelling-houses to effect arrests, s.529.3 
requires the police to have reasonable grounds 
that the person to be arrested is present inside. 
In this case, the police admitted they had no 
grounds to believe the accused was there until 
after they entered. Prior to that point, it was 
only a possibility he might be there.  
 
The Entry and Arrest 
 
The appeal court did not end its analysis in 
considering the application of s.529.3. The 
justices went on to conclude that the 
warrantless entry and arrest was nonetheless 
lawful—through informed consent. Justice 
Freedman was satisfied that the accused’s 
father gave permission by his actions for the 
police to enter to look for the accused—even 
though there were no actual words of consent.  
The consent to enter was given by a person who 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
dwelling-house, which obviated the need for a 
warrant. The accused’s father was the 
homeowner and as the court noted, “was an 
active participant assisting the police, and his 
conduct and communication showed more than 
mere acquiescence or compliance.”  Justice 
Freedman stated: 
 
Once [the officer] made clear the purpose of 
his attendance (i.e., they were looking for the 
accused), [the accused’s father] could have 
said nothing, or he could have declined to 
speak, or he could have questioned [the 
officer], or he could have asked [the officer] 
to leave. Instead, without any further action 
by [the officer], [the accused’s father] told 
him that the accused was upstairs, and not to 
say anything. Moreover, he entered into a 
discussion with [the officer], and provided him 
information about the layout of the upstairs, 
where the accused was. This was clearly in 
connection with the purpose of the visit. [The 
accused’s father] knowingly and willingly 
facilitated the police's achieving their 
objective. [para. 58] 
 
Once the police found the accused, they were 
entitled to arrest him because they had the 
necessary reasonable grounds to do so required 
under s.495(1) of the Criminal Code. As for 
stepping over the doorway threshold and the 
impact it had on the legality of the arrest, 
Justice Freedman stated: 
 
It is clear to me that in relation to their 
entry into the house, the police acted in good 
faith, without trickery, without 
misleading…and, importantly, without any 
degree of force whatsoever (unlike in 
Feeney). They knocked on the door, and [the 
accused’s father] opened it, stepping back. 
[The officer] stepped over the threshold, 
without any words of invitation by the 
homeowner to do so. That act, in and of 
itself, is insufficient to render unlawful what 
followed. [para. 56, references omitted] 
 
A warrant to enter was unnecessary and the 
arrest was therefore lawful. 
 
The Search 
 
A person can only have standing to challenge the 
validity of a search and seizure if they can first 
establish they had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Although a homeowner has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their own home, a 
visitor, depending on the circumstances, may not 
necessarily have the same expectation. “For all 
persons, their dwelling-house is, at law, their 
castle, but it is not necessarily anyone else’s 
castle”, said Justice Freedman.  
 
In this case, the accused did not testify or call 
evidence. The only evidence before the court 
established that he did not live with his father, 
but rather lived at the victim’s residence for 
seven to eight years. The accused failed to 
establish any reasonable expectation of privacy 
at his father’s house and his s.8 Charter rights 
were not engaged. His father’s house was nothing 
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more than a “hideout” and the evidence was 
properly admitted at trial. His appeal was 
dismissed.   
 
Complete copy available at www.canlii.org 
 
OFFICER’s ALS CAUSED BY 
WORK INCIDENT 
WCAT-2003-04407 
 
In a landmark decision, British 
Columbia’s Worker’s 
Compensation Appeal Tribunal 
has held that a work related 
injury triggered amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis (ALS)—a neuromuscular disease 
commonly known as Lou Gehrig’s Disease—in an 
on-duty police officer. The officer was injured in 
an altercation after he was assaulted while 
responding to a domestic disturbance—his left 
shoulder hit the ground when tackled by the 
suspect. He applied for compensation, describing 
injuries to his shoulder, neck, back, hands, knee, 
and head. He was initially diagnosed with a non-
disabling soft tissue strain and the claim was 
accepted by the Worker’s Compensation Board 
(WCB) on a health claim basis only, with no time 
loss from employment. However, the symptoms 
persisted—including ongoing weakness, loss of 
coordination, spasms, muscle wasting, and 
slurred speech. After further medical 
examination the officer was diagnosed with ALS. 
The Board concluded that the shoulder strain 
was the only compensable injury and that the 
other ongoing problems and disability were 
related to the ALS, and were therefore non-
compensable.  
 
The officer appealed to the Worker’s 
Compensation Review Division. The review 
officer found the cause and effect relationship 
between the incident and the onset of ALS had 
not been explained. Relying on various medical 
opinions that muscle wasting was too advanced to 
connect it to the assault and that research had 
not demonstrated a reliable correlation between 
ALS and trauma, in the review officer’s view 
there was less than a 50% probability the 
officer’s ALS had been caused or triggered by 
the assault.  
 
The officer further appealed, this time to the 
Worker’s Compensation Appeal Tribunal—the 
final level of appeal for WCB claims. An expert 
gave oral evidence that the trauma suffered 
during the incident likely triggered the ALS 
based on the following: 
 
• the worker’s young age—just over 30 years—
only 10% of ALS victim’s are under 40; 
• the temporal relationship between the onset 
of the symptoms and the injury; and 
• the symptoms first appearing in the injured 
area and spreading outward.  
 
The expert also testified that there can be 
tremendous variability in the speed of symptom 
progression—the rapidity of onset and 
deterioration could be attributable to the 
officer’s young age. In this case, the tribunal 
had two opposing positions regarding causation—
compelling statistical information and studies 
against an expert’s medical opinion. In favouring 
the expert’s opinion over statistics, the Tribunal 
varied the Review Division’s decision and ruled 
that the compensable work-related assault had 
precipitated the onset of the ALS.  
 
Complete case available at www.wcat.bc.ca 
 
Canada’s Ten Largest Municipal Police Forces 
(2003) 
Police service Police officer total Population per Officer 
Toronto  5,315 492 
Montreal 4,070 455 
Peel Regional 1,454 718 
Calgary 1,442 635 
Edmonton 1,225 544 
Winnipeg 1,211 522 
Vancouver 1,192 487 
Ottawa 1,107 738 
York Regional 973 841 
Source: Statistics Canada 
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Lead with Passion, Deliver Results: Leadership for the Real World 
 
Overview 
 
Turbulent, unpredictable change is now the 
norm. Senior Executives are under increasing 
pressure to perform. Another short-term, quick 
fix approach to improved leadership won't help. 
What will help are the enduring principles of 
leadership learned at this Leadership Week.  
 
This unique collaborative training opportunity 
between the Justice Institute of BC and 
FranklinCovey with provide you with tools and 
training to help you truly lead your 
organization, rather than just manage it. You 
will learning enduring principles of sustained 
results and will discover natural laws of 
leadership that impact the core of 
organizational effectiveness. 
 
Date:   May 3rd-7th, 2004 9:00 am to 4:30 pm 
 
Location:  400 Burrard Street, Vancouver, BC Canada 
 
 
Who Should Attend and Why? 
 
This workshop is designed for corporate leaders or individuals who are leaders of tomorrow:  
• Senior leaders and commissioned officers of municipal police departments and the RCMP interested 
in meeting their leadership challenges by anticipating and influencing change rather than merely 
reacting to it.  
• Senior managers in justice and public safety. 
• Senior managers in the public sector.  
• High potential individuals and mid-career professionals ready to advance their leadership skills and 
desiring to make a significant difference.  
 
You will leave this workshop better understanding yourself, the direction of your organization, 
and how to successfully lead your employees. 
 
What Will Leaders Take Back to their Organizations?  
 
The tools, knowledge, and enthusiasm to immediately play a more significant role in changing their 
organizations:  
• Practical processes with real world application. 
• Each participant chooses a strategic challenge from their workplace that becomes the focus for their 
week. At the end of the week they have a plan on how to successfully drive this initiative for results. 
• Take Home Tools. Participants learn the four roles of leadership—modeling, pathfinding, aligning, 
and empowering—and get tools that enable an immediate business application.  
• Results. They learn how to unify and focus their teams on getting the right results, then how to build 
a pragmatic long-term plan for driving those results.  
• Renewed enthusiasm for their leadership roles and the impact their contribution has on their 
organization.  
 
Graduates leave with the desire and confidence to manage complex business problems and to 
achieve better results. 
 
